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USING THE PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT LAWS TO IMPROVE WATER 
POLLUTION ANTI-DEGRADATION  POLICIES 
Sandra Zellmer↓  and Robert L. Glicksman* 
  
Abstract 
 
The Clean Water Act’s principal goal is to “restore and maintain” the integrity of the 
nation’s surface water bodies.  The Act’s adoption was spurred largely by the perception that 
unchecked pollution had caused the degradation of those waters, making them unsuitable for 
uses such as fishing and swimming. At the time Congress passed the statute, however, some 
lakes, rivers, and streams had water quality that was better than what was needed to support 
these uses.  An important question was whether the statute would limit discharges with the 
potential to impair these high quality waters. EPA’s anti-degradation policy sought to ensure 
that it does.  This paper assesses the implementation of the anti-degradation policy for 
protecting water quality as good as or better than that required by state water quality standards.  
It traces the history of the policy, and analyzes the rationales for precluding degradation of high 
quality environmental resources reflected in both the Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act.  It 
assesses how successful the Clean Water Act’s anti-degradation mechanisms have been in 
practice, identifying several flaws in the design and implementation of the program.  To address 
these deficiencies, the article compares the Clean Water Act’s anti-degradation policy to 
nonimpairment and nondegradation mandates under the nation’s public natural resource 
management statutes.  Based on this comparative analysis, and the past four decades of 
experience with the Clean Water Act, the paper recommends several reforms to strengthen the 
Act’s anti-degradation policy’s capacity to promote its goals. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The visual images that helped spur the enactment during the 1970s of the nation’s 
foundation environmental laws, including the Clean Water Act (CWA), were largely of 
contaminated resources, such as burning rivers and oil-soaked seagulls.1  Similarly, evocative 
prose such as Rachel Carson’s description of the “strange blight”2 afflicting America in the 
1960s as a result of the use of chemical pesticides played a critical role in alerting policymakers 
and the public alike to the need for new legal protections for public health and the environment.  
Over the years, similar depictions of the environmental devastation resulting from unconstrained 
economic activity have continued to play an important role in creating the momentum for the 
adoption of new or strengthened environmental laws.3 
                                                 
1 See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 59 (2004) (describing “visually unsettling 
events” such as the smoldering Cuyahoga River and “seagulls suffocated in oil as a result of the Santa Barbara oil 
spill). 
2 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (Houghton Mifflin 1994 ed.) (quoted in ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 18 (6th ed. 2011). 
3 See, e.g., Martha L. Judy & Katherine N. Probst, Superfund at 30, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 192-93 (2009) 
(describing “sites regularly featured on the television news and in news magazines in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
[that] set the stage for passage of Superfund,” including the “’Valley of the Drums,’” [which] imprinted on the 
screen and in the minds of the American public colorful images of erupting, smoking, seeping, and corroding 
drums”); Tina M. Smith, Wildlife Protection and Offshore Drilling: Can There Be a Balance Between the Two?, 6 
FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 349, 366 (2011) (quoting NOAA Ocean Service Education, Prince William's Oily Mess: A 
Tale of Recovery, http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/education/stories/oilymess/oily01_ infamous.html ) (“The images 
Americans saw on television and the descriptions they heard over the radio [after the Exxon Valdez oil spill] ‘were 
of heavily oiled shorelines, dead and dying wildlife and thousands of workers mobilized to clean beaches.’”). 
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Environmental law, however, has always been about more than just repairing the damage 
wrought by past environmental disasters or mismanagement.  Senator Edmund Muskie, the 
principal sponsor of the CWA, for example, was moved to action not only by the environmental 
despoliation he witnessed, but also by “[t]he beauties of nature . . . in almost pristine form” at 
which he marveled while growing up.4  The nation’s environmental were adopted as much to 
preserve superior environmental quality as to restore damaged or degraded resources.5   
 
The Clean Water Act reflects this dual conception of the function of environmental law.  Its 
principal goals are to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity” of 
the nation’s surface water bodies.6  The Act’s adoption was spurred largely by the realization 
that unchecked pollution had caused the degradation of those waters, making them unsuitable for 
uses such as fishing and swimming.  At the time Congress passed the statute, however, some 
lakes, rivers, and streams had water quality that was better than what was needed to support these 
uses.  An important question was whether the statute would limit discharges with the potential to 
impair these high quality waters.  EPA’s anti-degradation policy provided an affirmative answer.  
Yet, the CWA’s maintenance goal has taken a decidedly back seat to its restoration goal, as both 
the paucity of statutory text on anti-degradation issues and the emphasis of federal and state 
implementation on improving the quality of impaired waters attest. 
 
This article focuses on the CWA’s relatively neglected maintenance aspects.  It assesses the 
degree to which federal and state implementation of the anti-degradation policy for protecting 
water quality as good or better than that required by state water quality standards has fostered the 
statutory maintenance goal.  Part II traces the history of the policy, and analyzes the rationales 
for precluding degradation of high quality environmental resources reflected in both the CWA 
and the Clean Air Act.  Part III assesses whether the CWA’s anti-degradation mechanisms have 
succeeded, and identifies several flaws in the program’s design and implementation.  Part IV 
compares the CWA’s anti-degradation policy to nonimpairment and nondegradation mandates 
under the nation’s public natural resource management statutes.  Based on this comparative 
analysis, and the past four decades of experience with the CWA, Part V recommends four 
reforms to strengthen the Act’s anti-degradation policy.  First, we recommend a federal 
regulation requiring states to designate outstanding national resource waters (ONRWs) in their 
water quality standard inventories, including waters within parks and wildlife refuges and other 
waters of “exceptional ecological significance.” In addition, we support requiring states to take 
concrete steps (including reducing aggregate discharges) to restore the quality of degraded high 
quality or exceptional waters so that they can support a full suite of beneficial uses and 
ecosystem services. Second, the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should define 
degradation by regulation to include the impairment of water quality that either results in loss or 
                                                 
4 Robert F. Blomquist, “To Stir up Public Interest”: Edmund S. Muskie and the U.S. Senate Special Subcommittee’s 
Water Pollution Investigations and Legislative Activities, 1963-66 – A Case Study in Early Congressional 
Environmental Policy Development, 22 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting EDMUND S. MUSKIE, JOURNEYS 
79-80 (1972)). 
5 See, e.g., the Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2006) (enunciating Congress’s goal of administering 
wilderness areas “in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for the future use and preservation as wilderness, so 
as to provide for the protection of these areas [and] the preservation of their wilderness character”). 
6 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
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threatened loss of an existing or potentially viable use – especially fishing, swimming, and 
higher uses – or adversely affects the ecological resilience of the affected water body.  Third, we 
support requiring states to extend their anti-degradation programs to cover nonpoint source 
pollutants.  Finally, to ensure proper implementation of the anti-degradation policy, EPA should 
adopt mandatory state planning and assessment responsibilities, particularly as applied to 
ONRWs.  These reforms would help fulfill the objectives of the anti-degradation program, move 
the nation closer to the goal of ensuring the integrity of our surface waters, and help the CWA 
function as more than just an impaired waters restoration mechanism. 
II. THE HISTORY, STRUCTURE, AND GOALS OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S ANTI-
DEGRADATION PROGRAM 
 
Federal efforts to prevent degradation of water quality predate the adoption of the Clean 
Water Act.  Congress endorsed these efforts when it amended the Act in 1977, although the 
cryptic manner in which it did so left the scope and content of the resulting anti-degradation 
program unclear.  This part reviews the history of federal efforts to prevent degradation of water 
resources and the structure of the current regulatory program.  It also describes the goals of both 
water and air pollution anti-degradation provisions. 
 
A. The History of Federal Anti-degradation Programs in Water Pollution Control 
 
 Before EPA’s creation in 1970, the Department of the Interior adopted guidelines to 
implement the 1965 Water Quality Act,7 which required all states to adopt water quality 
standards consisting of use designations (such as drinking or fishing) and water quality 
characteristics needed to permit those uses to occur.8  The guidelines provided that “[i]n no case 
will standards providing for less than existing water quality be acceptable,” and required that 
standards provide for “[t]he maintenance and protection of quality and use or uses of water now 
of a higher quality or of a quality suitable  for present and potential uses.”9  Enforcement of the 
guidelines was cursory.10 
 
In 1968, Interior Secretary Stewart Udall endorsed the policy of preventing degradation 
of existing clean water resources,11 but retreated from the absolute protection of existing water 
quality reflected in the 1966 guidelines.12  The Secretary’s policy required maintenance of waters 
                                                 
7 Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965). 
8 GLICKSMAN, supra note __, at 553. 
9 N. William Hines, A Decade of Nondegradation Policy in Congress and the Courts: The Erratic Pursuit of Clean 
Air and Clean Water, 62 IOWA L. REV. 643, 658 (1977) (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR FEDERAL WATER 
POLLUTION CONTROL ADMINISTRATION, GUIDELINES FOR ESTABLISHING WATER QUALITY STANDARDS FOR 
INTERSTATE WATERS 5, 7 (1966)). 
10 See Mary A. Stitts, Note, The Ever-Changing Balance of Power in Interstate Water Pollution: Do Affected States 
Have Anything to Say After Arkansas v. Oklahoma?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1341, 1356 (1993). 
11 Lauren Kalisek, The Principle of Antidegradation and Its Place in Texas Water Quality Permitting, 41 TEX. 
ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4 (2010).  See also Jeffrey M. Gaba, Federal Supervision of State Water Quality Standards Under the 
Clean Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1189-90 (1983) [hereinafter Gaba, Federal Supervision]; Michael C. 
Blumm & William Warnock, Roads Not Taken: EPA vs. Clean Water, 33 ENVTL. L. 79, 104 (2003).  
12 Hines, supra note  , at 659. 
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whose quality was better than established standards unless a state could justify degradation based 
on necessary economic or social development.  Degradation would not be allowed, however, to 
interfere with or injure designated uses then being made or which could be made of those 
waters.13 
 
 Despite the weakening of the 1966 guidelines, state governors and the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce complained that an anti-degradation policy would unreasonably restrict economic 
development, and state enforcement of the guidelines continued to lag.14  By the time Congress 
adopted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (now known as the Clean 
Water Act), the water quality standards of all fifty states nominally included versions of an anti-
degradation policy statement, but in most states, protection against degradation was little more 
than an unimplemented objective.15 
 
 The 1972 law said nothing about anti-degradation policy.  EPA, which had taken over 
control of federal water quality programs, took the position that such a policy was “consistent 
with the spirit, intent, and goals of the Act,” especially the goal of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] 
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”16  EPA refined the policy 
in 1975, creating the requirements that, with few changes, remain in place today.17  In 1987, 
Congress cryptically addressed anti-degradation of water quality for the first time, providing that 
for waters whose quality exceeds levels necessary to protect the designated use, any effluent 
limitation based on a total maximum daily load (TMDL)18 may be revised only if the revision “is 
subject to and consistent with the anti-degradation policy established under this section.”19  The 
statute, which still governs anti-degradation policy, simply incorporates by reference EPA’s prior 
administrative policy.20 
 
 B. The Structure of the Anti-degradation Program 
 
                                                 
13 Kalisek, supra note  , at 5-6.  See 40 Fed. Reg. 55340 (Nov. 28, 1975). 
14 Michael Snyder, Note, Nondegradation of Water Quality: The Need for Effective Action, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
890, 893, 897 (1975). 
15 Hines, supra note __, at 659-60. 
16 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) (emphasis added).  See EPA, Questions and Answers on Antidegradation 1 (Aug. 
1985) [hereinafter Qs & As], available at 
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/upload/2006_12_01_standards_antidegqa.pdf. 
17 40 C.F.R. § 131.12.   EPA amended the policy in 1983.  It  created a limited exception for temporary or short-term 
changes in water quality in Outstanding National Resource Waters (ONRW), which previously had been protected 
from all degradation.  John Harleston, What Is Antidegradation Policy: Does Anyone Know?, 5 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 33, 
47 (1996).  EPA made this change because it “was concerned that waters which properly could have been designated 
as ONRW were not so designated because of the flat no degradation provision, and therefore were not being given 
special protection.”  48 Fed. Reg. 51402 (Nov. 8, 1983).   See also Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal 
Lands II: Water Pollution, 12 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 61, 83 (1993); John L. Horwich, Water Quality 
Nondegradation in Montana: Is Any Deterioration Too Much?, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 145, 158-60 (1993). 
18 A total maximum daily load is the maximum aggregate pollution loading that the receiving water is capable of 
assimilating without violating applicable water quality standards by creating excessive pollutant concentrations or 
interfering with designated uses.  GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note at __, at 627. 
19 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2006). 
20 Jeffrey Gaba,  New Sources, New Growth and the Clean Water Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 651, 672 (2004) [hereinafter 
Gaba, New Growth]. 
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An anti-degradation policy is a required component of the water quality standards that 
states must adopt and enforce.21  EPA regulations currently provide that each state must adopt an 
anti-degradation policy that includes three elements.22  First, existing instream uses and the level 
of water quality necessary to protect those uses must be maintained and protected—state 
standards must be “sufficient to maintain existing beneficial uses of navigable waters, preventing 
their further degradation.”23  Second, the state must maintain water quality that exceeds levels 
necessary to support propagation of fish and wildlife, and water recreation, unless allowing 
lower water quality is necessary to accommodate important economic or social development.24  
Even then, water quality standards must fully protect existing uses.  In addition, the state must 
assure achievement of the highest statutory and regulatory requirements for all point sources and 
all cost-effective and reasonable best management practices for nonpoint sources.  Third, the 
state must maintain quality in high quality waters that constitute an “outstanding National 
resource,” including waters of national and state parks and wildlife refuges and waters of 
“exceptional recreational or ecological significance.”25  In short, the policy requires different 
levels of protection for three types, or tiers, of waters.26  Under Tier 1, existing uses must be 
maintained in all waters.  Under Tier 2, for high-quality waters that exceed fishable/swimmable 
quality, degradation will be allowed only if it is necessary to accommodate important social or 
economic development in the region.  Degradation of water quality is completely prohibited for 
Tier 3, Outstanding National Resource Waters (ONRWs),27 although “temporary and short-term 
                                                 
21 PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 718-19 (1994). 
22 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a).  According to one court, the requirement to adopt an anti-degradation policy does not apply 
to CWA permitting programs administered by federal agencies.  City of Olmsted Falls v. EPA, 435 F.3d 632, 637 
(6th Cir. 2005) (finding anti-degradation policy inapplicable to federal issuance of dredge and fill permits).  The 
CWA provides, however, that all federal agencies must comply with state water quality standards, including a state’s 
anti-degradation policy.  33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2006); Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1153 (9th 
Cir. 1998). 
23 PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 705.  See also Qs & As, supra note  , at 3 (stating that “no activity is 
allowable . . . which could partially or completely eliminate any existing use”). 
24 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2).  Aside from an unrealistic no discharge goal, the Clean Water Act’s primary goal is to 
achieve, wherever attainable, “water quality which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and 
wildlife and provides for recreation in and on the water . . . .”  33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2006). 
25 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(3). 
26 EPA has endorsed the adoption by some states of an additional tier, Tier 2.5, that protects waters to a greater 
degree than Tier 2 but not as much as Tier 3.  Tier 2.5 waters require “a very high level of water quality protection 
without precluding unforeseen future economic and social development considerations.”  Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. 
Browner, 127 F.3d 1126, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (describing Tier 2.5 protection for Lake Michigan) (quoting 
Environmental Protection Agency, Water Quality Standards Handbook § 4.2, at 4-2 (2d ed. 1994)).  See also Ohio 
Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d 732, 773-74 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (approving in part and 
disapproving in part West Virginia’s provisions for Tier 2.5).  “Because Tier 2.5 is not required by EPA regulations, 
the only restriction on [a state’s] Tier 2.5 standards is that they not fall below the minimum standards set for Tier 2.”  
Id. at 773. 
27 Kalisek, supra note __, at 9.  See also Columbus & Franklin Cty. Metro. Park Dist. v. Shank, 600 N.E.2d 1042, 
1055-56 (Ohio 1992) (refusing to equate degradation of existing water quality with an interference with an existing 
use for purposes of application of Ohio’s anti-degradation rules to high quality waters, and rejecting state agency’s 
application of a technological approach that limited pollutants to a level consistent with water quality criteria for 
exceptional waters because “the analysis proceeds from a false premise that the applicable water quality standard is 
determined by the use designation rather than the antidegradation policy”). 
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changes” in water quality to accommodate important economic uses are allowed.28  Thus, the 
policy is designed to protect both existing uses and existing water quality, but in different 
circumstances.  The Tier 1 provisions are directed at protection of existing uses, while the Tier 2 
component aims to protect the quality of high quality waters.29  Tier 3 also focuses on protection 
of water quality.  
 
The anti-degradation policy may affect states administering the CWA or discharging 
sources in several circumstances.  States must review and, if appropriate, revise their water 
quality standards at least once every three years.  Any such revisions must comply with the anti-
degradation policy.  If a state fails to adopt an adequate anti-degradation policy, EPA must adopt 
one for the state.30 If a state issues a discharge permit for a point source that violates the anti-
degradation policy, EPA may veto the permit.31  EPA also may disapprove TMDLs that violate 
the policy.32   
 
In addition, the Act requires those seeking a federal license or permit for an activity that 
may result in a discharge (such as operation of a hydropower plant or the filling of wetlands) to 
provide a certification that the discharge will comply with state water quality standards.   
Without such a certification, the federal agency may not issue the license or permit.33  Activities 
covered by this requirement include discharges requiring a CWA permit in a state in which EPA, 
rather than a state, administers the permit program.34  If a state’s certification for an EPA-issued 
                                                 
28 Water Quality Standards Regulation, 48 Fed. Reg. 51,400, 51,403 (Nov. 8, 1983); OFFICE OF WATER, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, EPA 823-B-94-005, WATER QUALITY STANDARDS HANDBOOK: SECOND EDITION 4-10 (2d ed. 
1994), http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/handbook/index.cfm. 
29 Gaba, Federal Supervision, supra note __, at 1192. 
30 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(4) (2006).  Raymond Proffitt Found v. EPA, 930 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1098 (E.D. Pa. 1996), 
held that EPA has a nondiscretionary duty to issue a federal anti-degradation program for a state with a deficient 
program.  Cf. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida v. EPA, 105 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that district 
court improperly dismissed CWA citizen suit alleging that EPA violated nondiscretionary duty to determine whether 
state changes to water quality standards violated CWA requirements, including the anti-degradation policy).  But cf. 
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Browner, 127 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that EPA did not have nondiscretionary 
duty to review and evaluate existing state water quality standards retained after a state’s triennial review). 
 
31 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d) (2006). 
32 Qs & As, supra note __, at 2. 
33 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2006).  See Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding 
denial of state certification for natural gas pipeline on ground that backfill discharge would violate state’s anti-
degradation policy); FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 926 A.2d 1197 (Me. 2007) (dam and 
reservoir facilities not exempt from anti-degradation policy); Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Dep’t of Ecology, 146 Wash. 
2d 778, 51 P.3d 744 (2002) (holding that § 101(g) of the CWA did not preclude state environmental agency from 
imposing minimum streamflow requirements in water quality certification  on holder of state water rights).  But cf. 
Great Basin Mine Watch v. Hankins, 456 F.3d 955, 964 (9th Cir. 1996)  (“The anti-degradation policy only refers to 
water quality standards and does not refer to water withdrawal.”).  Federal agencies may have the power to impose 
conditions on licensees that are more protective of water quality than a state certification is.  See, e.g., Snoqualmie 
Indian Tribe v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008). 
34 Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).  Most states have received EPA approval to administer at least 
portions of the Clean Water Act’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit program.  EPA, State 
Program Status, http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm.  
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discharge permit fails to comply with the anti-degradation policy, EPA may add more stringent 
effluent limitations to ensure compliance with the policy.35   
 
 C. The Goals of Anti-degradation Programs 
 
The reasons to mandate the improvement of inferior quality natural resources are 
relatively obvious, and include ensuring that exposure to or use of those resources does not 
adversely affect public health, destroy critical wildlife or fish populations, or otherwise disrupt 
ecosystem functions.  By contrast, no single goal explains legal mandates to prevent degradation 
of superior quality resources.  Instead, anti-degradation programs rest on a variety of rationales, 
including the desire to provide a margin of safety to offset the risk that regulations will not 
provide the desired level of protection, protect special value natural resources, prevent the 
movement of industry to areas with superior environmental quality, prevent interstate pollution, 
and preserve opportunities for future economic growth.  The federal CWA and Clean Air Act 
(CAA), which contain the best known anti-degradation programs among the pollution control 
laws, illustrate each of these justifications for preventing degradation of high quality resources.36 
 
  1. Providing a Margin of Safety 
 
The CAA and the CWA both require the adoption of ambient quality standards to provide 
a minimally acceptable level of environmental quality.  The CAA requires that EPA adopt 
primary standards that are requisite to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety 
and secondary standards that protect the public welfare from known or anticipated adverse 
effects associated with air pollution.37  The CWA requires states to adopt water quality standards 
that assure that pollutant concentrations will protect designated uses.38  Both sets of standards 
establish maximum permissible concentrations of pollutants in the air or water. 
 
Environmental regulation often proceeds in the face of scientific uncertainty.  As a result, 
regulators may determine that a particular concentration level is sufficient to achieve the desired 
level of protection, only to discover later that adverse effects occur at lower pollution 
concentrations than once believed.  Anti-degradation rules can protect against such 
                                                 
35 Qs & As, supra note __, at 2. 
36 Other federal pollution control laws seek to prevent degradation of existing environmental quality less directly, by 
incorporating the anti-degradation regimes established under other laws instead of creating independent 
requirements.  See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 265.193(g)(2)(iii)(D) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act regulations 
requiring EPA, in issuing variances from hazardous waste management requirements, to consider the potential 
adverse effects of a release on surface water quality, taking into account water quality standards, including the anti-
degradation policy, established for surface waters in the area of the affected facility) . 
Similarly, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act provides that if 
any requirement under a federal law such as the CWA is “legally applicable to” a hazardous substance release or is 
“relevant and appropriate under the circumstances of the release,” then the remedial action selected by EPA must 
comply with that requirement.  At a minimum, the action must attain relevant and appropriate water quality criteria 
found in CWA water quality standards. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(d)(2)(A).  For a case holding that a state groundwater anti-
degradation law was “legally applicable or relevant and appropriate” to a cleanup, but upholding EPA’s implicit 
waiver of that law, see U.S. v. Akzo Coatings of Am., Inc., 949 F.3d 1409, 1445-49 (6th Cir. 1991). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2006). 
38 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2006). 
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misjudgments about the scope of environmental risk.  One of the purposes of the CAA’s 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program is to protect public health “from any 
actual or potential adverse effect which in [EPA’s] judgment may reasonably be anticipated to 
occur from air pollution . . . notwithstanding attainment and maintenance of all national ambient 
air quality standards.”39 
 
Legislators in 1977 were skeptical of regulators’ ability to identify harmless 
concentrations of air pollution, and suspected that the only way to eliminate health risks would 
be to set ambient standards at zero.  Not willing to go that far, legislative supporters of the PSD 
program sought to minimize risk by keeping pollutant concentrations lower than required by air 
quality standards in areas that already had clean air.40   In this way, the program would provide a 
“margin of safety” in case pollution actually caused harm at concentrations lower than any 
threshold levels identified by EPA or if EPA refused for economic reasons to tighten the 
standards despite new evidence that existing standards were not sufficiently protective.41   
Accordingly, anti-degradation requirements create a safety net in the event existing ambient 
quality standards are inadequate.42 
 
  2. Protecting High-Value Natural Resources 
  
 A second function of anti-degradation constraints is to protect highly valued natural 
resources that may be at risk from exposure to pollutant concentrations that are established to 
protect public health.  Both the CAA and CWA programs seek to promote that goal.   
 
One of the purposes of the CAA’s PSD program is to preserve, protect, and enhance air 
quality in national parks, wilderness areas, and other areas of “special” natural, recreational, 
scenic, or historic value.43  Because adverse effects on natural resources may occur at 
concentrations lower than those that trigger health risks, the CAA’s welfare-based secondary 
standards may be more stringent than the health-based primary standards.44  Even then, 
secondary standards may not be adequate to protect particularly vulnerable resources, or EPA 
may have underestimated how clean the air needs to be to protect those resources. 
 
During congressional debate, supporters of the PSD program emphasized the benefits of 
protecting parks from air pollution, claiming that preservation of clean air would prevent damage 
                                                 
39 42 U.S.C. § 7470(1) (2006). 
40 David P. Currie, Nondegradation and Visibility Under the Clean Air Act, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 77 (1980). 
41 See Craig N. Oren, Prevention of Significant Deterioration: Control-Compelling Versus Site-Shifting, 74 IOWA L. 
REV. 1, 64 (1988) [hereinafter Oren, Control-Compelling]. PSD’s supporters also viewed the program as necessary 
because the national standards did not cover certain damaging pollutants such as sulfates that cause acid rain and 
failed to account for the synergistic effects of multiple pollutants.  Id. at 60, 82. 
42 Richard B. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of 
Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from The Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 713, 742 n.144 (1977) 
[hereinafter Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law]. 
43 42 U.S.C. § 7470(2) (2006).  See generally Craig N. Oren, The Protection of Parklands from Increased Air 
Pollution: A Look at Current Policy, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 313 (1989) [hereinafter Oren, Parklands]. 
44 DAVID WOOLEY & ELIZABETH MORSS, CLEAN AIR ACT HANDBOOK, Appendix C (2011).  In practice, EPA rarely 
establishes separate secondary standards.  See GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note __, at 406. 
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that would occur even at pollution concentrations allowed by the national ambient air quality 
standards.45  Degradation of air quality in national parks would interfere with scenic vistas in 
places like the Grand Canyon and damage unique natural resources, frustrating the opportunities 
for preservation, recreation, and spiritual renewal that justified creation of the national parks and 
other protected areas.46  The CWA’s anti-degradation policy serves the same function through its 
prohibition on water quality degradation in ONRWs.47  Enhanced protections are particularly 
critical if resource damage is expected to be irreversible or would interfere with the broader 
functioning of critical ecosystem services.48 
 
  3. Preventing the Development of Pollution Havens 
 
Without a nondegradation policy, areas with relatively clean air or water quality would 
have a greater capacity to assimilate pollution without violating applicable ambient standards 
than would more polluted areas.  Under both the CAA and the CWA, pollution control 
requirements tend to be most stringent in highly polluted areas that are in violation of ambient 
quality standards.  The CAA imposes rigorous controls on pollution sources in nonattainment 
areas,49 and the stringency of the controls tends to increase in relation to the degree of 
noncompliance.50  Under the CWA, states whose waters are more polluted than state water 
quality standards allow must establish TMDLs that represent aggregate limitations on discharges 
into those impaired waters.51  Absent nondegradation programs, new industrial sources with 
choices about where to locate (putting other factors aside) would tend to choose areas with less 
stringent pollution controls to reduce costs of operation.52  The result would be not only 
degradation of existing good environmental quality, but also an exodus of business from 
industrialized areas to more remote, cleaner areas.   
 
Anti-degradation provisions can prevent “pollution havens” by removing incentives that 
would drive industry to clean areas if they were allowed to deteriorate to minimal levels required 
by ambient standards.  These provisions address a classic prisoner’s dilemma because states with 
high air or water quality would bear most of the costs of maintaining it, while recouping only a 
small portion of the benefits.53  “Each state, fearing undercutting by a state competing for 
economic development, would be reluctant to adopt a potentially disabling policy absent some 
assurance about what other states intended to do.  All states would thus be paralyzed to act.”54  
                                                 
45 Oren, Parklands, supra note __, at 329. 
46 Id. at 315, 346-47. 
47 See supra notes __ - __ and accompanying text. 
48 See, e.g., ROBERT W. ADLER, JESSICA C. LANDMAN & DIANE M. CAMERON, THE CLEAN WATER ACT: 20 YEARS 
LATER 200 (1993) (noting that headwater tributaries of larger watersheds can “provide clean base flow and critical 
spawning and rearing habitat to support downstream flows”). 
49 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c) (2006) (listing requirements for SIPs that cover nonattainment areas). 
50 See, e.g., id. § 7511a (requirements for ozone nonattainment areas). 
51 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2006). 
52 See Snyder, supra note __, at  891-92 (recommending maintenance of “the essential complementary relation 
between abatement and nondegradation”). 
53 Stewart, Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note __, at 747. 
54 Hines, supra note 21, at 654.  See also Stewart, supra note __, at 747 (noting the usefulness of anti-degradation 
requirements in addressing the “commons’ dilemma” by forcing states “to adopt policies which they would 
voluntarily select in the absence of transaction costs precluding common agreement”). 
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The CAA’s PSD program was designed to neutralize the attractiveness to industry of areas with 
superior air quality.55  The CWA’s anti-degradation policy serves a similar function.56 
.  
  4. Preventing Interstate Pollution 
 
The CAA’s PSD program also sought to prevent activities in one state from harming 
other states by preventing areas from becoming “‘dumping grounds’ for the pollution caused by 
industrial sources in other regions.”57  The argument was apparently persuasive.  One of the 
goals of the program is “to assure that emissions from any sources in any State will not interfere 
with any portion of the applicable implementation program to prevent significant deterioration of 
air quality for any other State.”58 
 
A dispute between Arkansas and Oklahoma illustrates the potential for the CWA’s anti-
degradation policy to constrain interstate water pollution.  The city of Fayetteville, Arkansas 
applied for a permit from EPA that would allow its new municipal wastewater treatment plant to 
discharge treated wastewater into a tributary of the Illinois River about forty miles upstream 
from the Arkansas-Oklahoma border.  Oklahoma protested, arguing to EPA that the discharge 
would impair a portion of the River it had designated as a Tier 3 scenic river.59  EPA issued the 
permit anyway, finding that the discharge would not result in an actual, detectable violation of 
Oklahoma’s water quality standards.60  Responding to Oklahoma’s challenge to the permit, the 
Supreme Court deferred to EPA’s determination that both the CWA and EPA’s own 
regulations61 authorize EPA to ensure that a discharge not violate downstream water quality 
standards.62  However, the Court affirmed EPA’s finding that the treatment plant’s discharge 
would not cause an actual, detectable violation of the Oklahoma standards.63  Indeed, the Court 
concluded that it was not arbitrary for EPA to base issuance of the permit partly on the benefits 
to the River resulting from the increased flow of relatively clean water from the new plant.64  
The Court’s decision endorsed EPA’s view that the CWA bars interstate pollution that causes 
                                                 
55 See Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note __, at 105, 111 (attributing the passage of the PSD program in 1977 to 
an effort by industrialized states to limit economic growth in the Sunbelt).  Distributional considerations may cut 
against the adoption of an anti-degradation policy, too.  According to Richard Stewart, a nondegradation policy 
“would inhibit economic development in areas with considerable poverty and unemployment, while the benefits 
would accrue in large measure to the wealthy who can afford to visit scenic areas of exceptionally high 
environmental quality or who are more likely to derive psychic satisfaction from their preservation.”  Stewart, 
Quasi-Constitutional Law, supra note __, at 750. 
56 Cf. Bonnie A. Malloy, Testing Cooperative Federalism: Water Quality Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 6 
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 63, 85 (2011) (noting that “lower standards would be more likely to attract 
industry”). 
57 Oren, Control-Compelling, supra note __, at 85. 
58 42 U.S.C. § 7470(4) (2006). 
59 Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 95 (1992). 
60 Id. at 97. 
61 40 C.F.R. § 122.4.  That section continues to preclude EPA from issuing a discharge permit “[w]hen the 
imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected 
States.”     
62 Arkansas, 503 U.S. at 105-07.  The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the CWA requires EPA to 
protect water quality in a downstream state from an upstream discharge in another state. 
63 Id. at 111-12. 
64 Id. at 114. 
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water quality standard violations, including violations of the anti-degradation policy, although in 
practice the standard of proof linking an upstream discharge with a downstream water quality 
violation may be difficult to meet.65 
  5. Balancing Environmental Protection Goals and Economic Growth 
Opportunities 
 
Anti-degradation programs seek to balance protection of existing clean air and water 
quality and continued economic growth.  A goal of the CAA’s PSD program is to “insure that 
economic growth will occur in a manner consistent with the preservation of existing clean air 
resources.”66  Under the CWA’s policy, degradation of Tier 2 waters is allowed if necessary to 
accommodate important social and economic development.  Under this approach, 
“nondegradation policy does not make existing resource quality an absolute minimum.”67  The 
result is “a flexible, site-specific consideration of the economic justifications and social need for 
water quality degradation in light of available alternatives and the significance of the predicted 
degradation.”68   
 
Anti-degradation policies can be a vehicle for promoting efficient resource allocation.  
Degradation is allowed if the value of the economic development that causes it exceeds the 
resulting marginal decline in the value of the degraded resource.  Anti-degradation advocates 
have even couched these programs as job creators, which create opportunities for new sources by 
requiring tighter source controls and low ambient concentrations in clean areas.69  An anti-
degradation program also may serve as a temporary device to postpone exploitation of good 
environmental quality until the potential for economic growth justifies the resulting degradation.  
By one account, some PSD supporters apparently held this view.70  This argument for 
postponing exploitation “draws from the conservationist, rather than the preservationist, roots of 
the environmental movement”71 in that the former supported management of natural resource use 
to maximize economic return over time.72 
                                                 
65 For criticism of the standard of proof (i.e., that an upstream source is causing an actual, detectable violation of 
another state’s water quality standards) endorsed by the Court, see Robert L. Glicksman, Watching the River Flow: 
The Prospects for Improved Interstate Water Pollution Control, 43 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 119 (1993). 
66 42 U.S.C. § 7470(3) (2006). 
67 Hines, supra note __, at 645. 
68 Mark C. Van Putten, The Dilution of the Clean Water Act, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 863, 899 (1986). EPA’s failure 
to define important economic and social development has given states broad discretion to endorse degradation of 
Tier 2 waters, as long as existing uses are not prevented or state water quality standards otherwise violated.  See 
ADLER ET AL., supra note  , at 202; infra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
69 Oren, Control Compelling, supra note  , at 97. 
70 Id. at  101.  “Representative Waxman, for instance, urged that the program ought to be adopted as a means to 
control the growth of clean air areas so that there would be room for future industrial growth; this statement perhaps 
implies a desire to use PSD to keep some clean air for later appropriation.”  Id. 
71 Id. (“[A] conservationist argument for maintaining clean air better than the air quality standards could hold that 
some restrictions on development now are necessary to assure that future exploitation opportunities are not 
sacrificed.”). 
72 See Hines, supra note __, at 646 (noting that “the idea of nondegradation seems to be closely related to large 
principles of conservation”). These conservation principles are similarly expressed in the sustained yield provisions 
of the Federal Lands Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) 
described in Part IV.A.5, infra.  
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III. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE WITH THE CLEAN WATER ACT’S ANTI-DEGRADATION 
PROGRAM 
 
The success of anti-degradation programs in preventing deterioration of high quality 
water bodies varies widely from state to state.  Although the anti-degradation policy is intended 
to protect high quality waters, it is by no means a precise set of instructions to the states.73  EPA 
interprets its role in the enforcement of anti-degradation policies as a passive one.74  It may 
disapprove and promulgate all or part of an implementation process for anti-degradation if, in the 
judgment of the Administrator, the state’s process (or certain provisions thereof) circumvents the 
intent and purpose of the federal anti-degradation policy.75  However, EPA rarely does so.76  
EPA’s proclivity for leaving the policy vague, and for affording broad discretion to the states, 
has precluded the development of a consistent national anti-degradation policy.77  As a result, 
critics describe the policy as “at best, obscure,” and lacking in substantive content.78   
 
 The states’ designation criteria and processes vary tremendously.  Moreover, when water 
bodies do get designated, the states’ implementation of permitting authorities does not always 
ensure against degradation of those water bodies.  This part reviews the nation’s experiences 
with the designation of high quality waters and with the subsequent implementation of protective 
measures for, and permitting decisions in, those waters.  It concludes with an assessment of the 
antidegradation policy’s deficiencies. 
 
 A. State Designation Variations 
 
The designation process for Tier 1 through 3 waters “varies enormously” from state to 
state.79 EPA’s anti-degradation policy does not provide adequate guidance on how to distinguish 
between Tier 1 and Tier 2 waters.80  Likewise, EPA’s definition of Tier 3 (Outstanding National 
                                                 
73 Harleston, supra note __, at, 52-53 (“In its almost thirty years of existence, few details of implementing 
antidegradation have been expressed.”). 
74 National Resources Defense Council, Effective Environmental Compliance and Governance: Perspectives from 
the Natural Resources Defense Council (2010), http://docs.nrdc.org/international/files/int_10051901a.pdf. 
75 EPA, Water Quality Handbook- Chapter 4. Antidegradation (Aug. 15, 1994), available at 
http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/handbook/chapter04.cfm#section8 (visited Feb. 4, 2012). 
76 See National Resources Defense Council, Effective Environmental Compliance and Governance: Perspectives 
from the Natural Resources Defense Council (2010), http://docs.nrdc.org/international/files/int_10051901a.pdf 
(noting that EPA could serve an important catalyst in defining minimum standards, but that it must work more 
closely with the states to ensure compliance with the laws). 
77 Id. at 77. 
78 Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 409, 454 (2007) [hereinafter Gaba, General Permits].  See also Robert W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to 
Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 203, 292 (1999) (“the current [CWA 
anti-degradation] program . . . is so vague as to defy clear explanation”). 
79 River Network: Implementing the Clean Water Act in the Intermountain West: An Overview; Chapter 2: Water 
Quality Standards: Antidegradation (2010), available at http://www.rivernetwork.org/sites/default/files/chapter2.pdf. 
80 40 C.F.R. 131.12(a); Gaba, General Permits, supra note ___, at 454.  See Gaba, New Growth, supra note __, at 
675 (“Unfortunately, the difference between Tier 1 and Tier 2 waters may, in many cases, be more metaphysical 
than biological.”); Kalisek, supra note __, at 10-11 (stating that the states have struggled with how to identify Tier 2 
high-quality waters). 
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Resource Waters) is unclear.81  Some state regulations provide no information whatsoever on 
how a waterbody might be nominated or how a designation decision might be made, leaving 
protection of the highest quality waters at risk.82  “Designation policies in many states are so 
vague as to be hard for a concerned citizen or watershed group to use … or even to understand 
how they could use them.”83  As a result, courts tend to defer to the agencies’ designation 
decisions unless there is no evidence whatsoever to support them.84 
 
Criteria and processes for distinguishing between Tier 1 and Tier 2 waters are especially 
opaque.  In Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, the Sixth Circuit addressed a series of 
challenges to Kentucky’s anti-degradation policy.85  The court deferred to EPA’s view that its 
own regulations permitted either a pollutant-by-pollutant or water body-by-water body approach 
to determining which waters merit Tier 2 protection.86  It also allowed automatic exclusion of 
impaired waters from Tier 2,87 and found that a state’s program complies with the anti-
degradation policy as long as all waters whose quality exceeds fishable/swimmable water quality 
are afforded Tier 2 protection.88  According to the court, neither the CWA nor EPA regulations 
require that a minimum percentage of a state’s waters be afforded Tier 2 protection.   
 
 In contrast, in West Virginia, a district court invalidated EPA’s approval of the state’s 
anti-degradation program for deficiencies in both designation and implementation.89  With 
regard to designation, the court rejected the state’s classification of segments of the Kanawha 
and Monongahela Rivers as Tier 1 waters.  The absence of evidence about the water quality of 
those rivers failed to support denying them the more stringent protection of Tier 2.90  The court 
also invalidated EPA’s approval of a provision that failed to require Tier 2 protection in all cases 
where the water segment supported minimum fishable/swimmable uses and had assimilative 
capacity remaining for some parameters.91 
 
With respect to the most protective category—Tier 3 ONRWs—some states have no 
regulations regarding processes or criteria for making designation decisions.92  Perhaps not 
                                                 
81 40 C.F.R. 131.12(a)(3). See John A. Chilson, Keeping Clean Waters Clean: Making the Clean Water Act’s 
Antidegradation Policy Work, 32 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 545, 553-55 (1999). 
82 River Network, supra note __, at 51.  [Is this the correct citation?]  See, e.g., Am. Littoral Soc’y v. EPA, 199 F. 
Supp. 2d 217 (D,N.J. 2002) (rejecting challenge to state’s failure to designate any waters to be protected by anti-
degradation policy because the plaintiffs failed to identify any waters requiring protection). 
83 River Network, supra note __, at 50, available at http://www.rivernetwork.org/sites/default/files/chapter3.pdf. 
84 See, e.g., Petition of Town of Sherburne, 154 Vt. 596, 581 A.2d 274 (1990) (upholding downgrading of waters to 
accommodate proposed sewage disposal facility). 
85 Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, 540 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2008). 
86 Id. at 475-77. 
87 Id. at 477-81. 
88 Id. at 481. 
89 Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d 732 (S.D. W. Va. 2003). 
90 Id. at 737.  The court ruled that EPA regulations permit classification of waters as Tier 1 or Tier 2 based on a 
water body-by-water body approach, without having to make classifications for each pollutant.  Id. at 747-48.  But 
the record contained no evidence to justify classifying the rivers as Tier 1, other than their appearance on the list of 
impaired waters.  Id. at 750. 
91 Id. at 765-66.   
92 River Network, supra note __  at 51. 
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surprisingly, then, some states have no ONRWs within their boundaries.93  EPA regulations 
include as examples of ONRWs “waters of National and State parks and wildlife refuges and 
waters of exceptional recreational or ecological significance.”94  But these waters are not covered 
unless a state takes affirmative steps to designate them.  Absent explicit state designations, courts 
have refused to recognize ONRWs at the behest of citizens’ groups.95  
 
A few states do in fact use the ONRW designation to protect wilderness waters and 
critical habitat, in addition to parks, refuges, and other unique water bodies.96  Montana 
automatically designates all “surface waters located wholly within the boundaries of designated 
national parks or wilderness areas.”97 Florida’s ONRW program includes parks, refuges, 
wilderness areas, memorials, and waters of special recreational or ecological significance.98  
Colorado includes water bodies that constitute “a significant attribute” of wilderness areas.99  In 
Washington, however, to be eligible as ONRWs, water bodies within wilderness areas must be 
“relatively pristine” or possess exceptional water quality.100   
 
New Mexico’s experience might serve as an example of how efforts to designate and 
protect ONRWs can work fairly well.  In 2010, the New Mexico Water Quality Control 
Commission adopted an across-the-board rule designating all perennial surface waters in Forest 
Service wilderness areas as ONRWs.101  Prior to the rule, there were only two ONRWs in New 
Mexico—the Rio Santa Barbara in the Pecos Wilderness and the waters of the Valle Vidal in the 
Carson National Forest.102  The new designation covers 700 miles of 195 perennial rivers and 
                                                 
93 Judith M. Brawer, Antidegradation Policy and Outstanding National Resource Waters in the Northern Rocky 
Mountain States, 20 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 13, 21 (1999). See 63 Fed. Reg. 36742, 36786 
(characterizing the designation of ONRWs as limited, although some states have designated a high percentage of 
their waters as ONRWs). 
94 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(3); see Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in 
Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 716–20 (1995) (describing the implications of ONRW designation on 
diversions of water from tributaries to Mono Lake for use in Los Angeles). 
95 See, e.g., Save the Lake v. Schregardus, 141 Ohio App. 3d 530, 752 N.E.2d 295 (2001) (refusing to treat waters 
within a state park as automatically entitled to ONRW status).  
96 See C. Mark Hersh, The Clean Water Act’s Antidegradation Policy and Its Role in Watershed Protection in 
Washington State, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 217, 222–29 (2009); Brawer, supra note  , at 20–27 
(discussing designation of ONRWs in Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming). 
97 MONT. ADMIN. R. 17.30.617(1) (2006). 
98 FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. 62-302.700(2). 
99 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1002-31:31.8(2)(a)(ii)(A) (2007); see id. § 1002-31:31.28(C)(3) (explaining that ONRW 
designations apply in wilderness areas despite the fact the wilderness areas already have other types of protections in 
place; to conclude otherwise “would prevent application of the outstanding waters designation to waters that may be 
among those most deserving of protection”). 
100 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-201A-330(1)(a). 
101 20.6.4.8.A(3) NMAC (2009); 20.6.4.8.A(3)-(4) NMAC (2011).  See Petition Protects Headwater Streams in 
Wilderness Areas of New Mexico (Dec. 1, 2010), available at http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/OOTS/documents/PR-
ONRWPassesFinal-12-1-10.pdf; N.M. CODE R. § 20.6.4.9.B, D (LexisNexis 2011) (providing criteria for ONRW 
designation).  Two other states in the intermountain west—Utah and Wyoming—have designated all waters within 
large geographic areas such as National Forests or Wilderness Areas as ONRWs. River Network, supra note __, at 
50. 
102 Jan. 19, 2012 email from Erik Schlenker-Goodrich, Western Environmental Law Center, Taos, NM. 
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streams, 29 lakes, and 1405 wetlands in 12 wilderness areas.103  According to the New Mexico 
Environment Department, “[t]hese waters represent the State’s most valuable headwater streams.  
Protection of these headwaters will help maintain a clean water supply for uses in Wilderness 
and for downstream uses by municipalities, agriculture, and recreational interests, and will help 
maintain healthy ecosystems, preserve habitat, and protect vulnerable and endangered 
species.”104 To protect ONRWs, the new rule prohibits new or increased point source discharges 
that would adversely impact water quality and requires best management practices (BMPs) for 
nonpoint sources.105  It provides that, “[e]xcept for pre-existing land-use activities (that comply 
with BMPs), water quality cannot be degraded in ONRWs.”106   
 
Ironically, some of the newly designated ONRWs are on the section 303(d) “impaired 
waters” list.107  The ONRW designation may stimulate restoration efforts on these waters. 
According to a representative of the Coalition for the Valle Vidal, the Valle Vidal is a good 
example of how ONRWs receive a fair amount of attention for restoration work.108  A long 
history of grazing, mining, and logging left the some of the Valle Vidal tributaries in a “highly 
degraded state.”109  Ongoing restoration efforts include relatively inexpensive, yet effective, low-
tech restoration projects like fencing, erosion control structures made of rock and vegetation, and 
road drainage devices that direct runoff into vegetative buffer zones.110 
 
Environmental groups applauded the state’s efforts to protect ONRWs.111  But the New 
Mexico Cattle Growers Association petitioned to set aside the new rule,112 and urged the 
Commission to designate smaller watersheds on a case-by-case basis rather than in one blanket 
                                                 
103 Order and Statement of Reasons, ¶ 7–8, In re Petition to Nominate Surface Waters in Forest Service Wilderness 
Areas as Outstanding National Resource Waters, WQCC 10-01(R) (Water Quality Control Comm’n Dec. 2010), 
available at ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/www/HearingOfficer/ONRW/WQCCOrder+SOR20.6.4NMAC.pdf. 
104 Press Release, Office of the Sec’y, supra note .  
105 NMDEQ, Antidegradation Policy Implementation Procedure 17 (2010), 
ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/www/swqb/CPP/2010/CPP-AppendixA.pdf.  
106 NMDEQ, Guidance for Nonpoint Source Discharges in Outstanding National Resource Waters G-1 (2009), 
ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/www/swqb/WPS/NPSPlan/2009NPSPlan-AppendixG11-30-10.pdf. 
107 Email from Schlenker-Goodrich, supra note. 
108 Id. 
109 Comanche Creek, Valle Vidal Unit, Carson National Forest (2005), http://www.comanchecreek.org/. 
110 Comanche Creek, Restoration Practices (2005), http://comanchecreek.org/Restoration_Practices/index.html. 
Restoration goals are “to meet current water quality standards; restore hydrologic function to the creek and its 
tributaries; and maximize habitat for the Rio Grande cutthroat trout.”  Id.  
111 Susan Montoya Bryan, NM Regulators Approve Outstanding Waters, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 1, 2010, 
available at ftp://ftp.nmenv.state.nm.us/www/swqb/News/AP12-01-2010Article.pdf.  For background, see Amigos 
Bravos, Overview of ONRW Protections and History in New Mexico (2012), http://amigosbravos.org/onrw.php. 
112 New Mexico Cattle Growers’ Ass'n v. Water Quality Control Comm'n, Ct. App. No. 31,191.  See Staci Matlock, 
New Rule Under Fire from N.M. Cattle Growers Association, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Jan. 10, 2011, 
http://www.santafenewmexican.com/localnews/outstanding-waters-New-rule-under-fire-from-cattle-growers (last 
visited Nov. 23, 2011). 
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rule.113  Despite the pressure, the Commission is going forward with the implementation of the 
new ONRW rule.114   
 
 B. State Implementation Variations 
 
EPA regulations require that state water quality standards “identify the methods for 
implementing” the anti-degradation policy.115  In some instances, litigants have leveled facial 
attacks on entire state programs or significant components of those programs, while in others 
they have identified more discrete actions, such as the issuance of permits, alleged to be in 
violation of the anti-degradation policy.  The judicial treatment of these challenges has been 
inconsistent, but one theme emerges:  a state anti-degradation program that is little more than an 
empty shell is vulnerable to attack. 
  1. Programmatic Attacks 
 
 In Kentucky Waterways Alliance, the Sixth Circuit took issue with Kentucky’s decision to 
exempt five categories of discharges from the requirement that new or expanded discharges into 
high quality waters pass Tier 2 review.116  The plaintiffs charged that the exemptions 
“eviscerate[d] Kentucky’s Tier [2] review process, allowing significant degradations in water 
quality without demonstrated necessity.”117  The court reasoned that because EPA’s anti-
degradation regulations protect assimilative capacity, EPA’s task was to focus on how much 
assimilative capacity would be lost under the exemptions, and in particular whether that loss 
would be significant or merely de minimis.118  Instead of assessing the exemptions’ cumulative 
effects, EPA measured Kentucky’s compliance by assessing whether each individual exemption 
resulted in “significant” or “insignificant” degradation of assimilative capacity.  The court 
therefore lacked an adequate factual record for determining whether the exemptions together 
permitted significant degradation, and it remanded to EPA for further analysis.119 
                                                 
113 See Brief of NMCGA, In the Matter of Petition to Nominate Surface Waters in Forest Service Wilderness as 
Outstanding National Resource Waters, Appeal from Water Quality Control Commission, WQCC Case No. 10-
01(R), Ct. App. No. 31,191 (Aug. 22, 2011).  
114 See Surface Water Quality Bureau, N.M. Env’t Dep’t, Water Quality Standards: Outstanding National Resource 
Waters, http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/swqb/ONRW/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2012).  The case is still pending.  Email 
from Schlenker-Goodrich, supra note . 
115  40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a). 
116 Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Johnson, 540 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2008). The five categories included any 
expanded discharge under a renewed or modified state permit, so long as the expansion did not increase pollutant 
loading by 20% or more.  Id. at 491. See supra notes ___-___ (describing court’s deference to EPA’s approval of 
Kentucky’s exclusion of certain waters from Tier 2 designation). 
117 Id. at 492. 
118 Id.  “[A]ssimilative capacity is a measurement of the amount by which . . . quality exceeds levels necessary to 
support fish, wildlife, and recreation.” Id. at 484.  According to EPA, “the central purpose of the federal Tier II 
antidegradation regulations is to protect a water body's assimilative capacity, which is ‘the difference between the 
applicable water quality criterion for a pollutant parameter and the ambient water quality for that parameter when it 
is better that the criterion.’” Id. (citing Memorandum from Ephraim S. King, Director of EPA Office of Science and 
Technology, to Water Management Division Directors (Aug. 10, 2005); Water Quality Standards Regulation, 63 
Fed. Reg. at 36,783). 
119 Id. at 492-93.  Cf. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. 279 F. Supp. 2d at 770-73 (invalidating EPA’s approval of a 
provision deeming degradation to be significant if the proposed activity, together with all other activities allowed 
after the baseline water quality is established, resulted in a reduction of a water segment’s available assimilative 
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Similarly, the West Virginia district court chastised EPA for ignoring the plain meaning 
of the state regulations in approving provisions allowing new or expanded discharges from 
wastewater treatment plants to evade Tier 2 review if the discharge resulted in a net decrease in 
the overall pollutant loading.120  According to the court, EPA’s approval in effect rewrote the 
provision to apply only when there is a net decrease in the pollutant loading for each pollutant 
parameter.121  
 
 EPA’s lack of vigilance in overseeing state compliance with the anti-degradation policy  
was also reflected in its approval of an egregiously deficient implementation plan in Oregon.122  
The plan contained only one sentence providing that the state’s entire body of water quality 
standards was “intended to implement the Antidegradation Policy.”123  The court held that EPA 
erred in approving a policy that failed to identify “even a semblance of an implementation plan,” 
in clear violation of its own regulation.124  Subsequently, when EPA approved Oregon’s revised 
implementation plan, its decision was remanded once again because the plan failed to specify a 
method to identify and protect existing uses.125  The court rejected EPA’s argument that the 
CWA does not specify a minimum method for implementing anti-degradation policies but 
simply requires that states “identify methods for their implementation.”126  It concluded that EPA 
must review the state’s entire implementation plan to ensure that it describes all of the required 
elements and does not circumvent the purpose of the anti-degradation policy.127  On the other 
hand, the court deferred to EPA’s determination that a provision that applied to “recognized 
beneficial uses” protected all “existing uses” from becoming “unacceptably threatened or 
impaired.”128  It also upheld EPA’s interpretation of Oregon’s use of the term “unacceptably” as 
allowing only de minimis threats or impairments to existing uses, but noted that “Oregon’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
capacity of 20% or more for parameters of concern because EPA failed to explain why a 20% reduction in 
assimilative capacity should be considered insignificant); Rivers Unlimited, Inc. v. Schregardus, 86 Ohio Misc. 2d 
78, 685 N.E.2d 603 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1997) (holding that state law allowing agency to approve lowering of stream’s 
water quality by as much as 80% of its assimilative capacity without anti-degradation review to be inconsistent with 
the CWA). 
120 Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 737-38, 752-57.  See supra notes ___-___ (describing court’s 
invalidation of Tier 1 designations).  
121 Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 279 F. Supp. 2d at 737-38, 752-57.  The court upheld EPA’s approval of other aspects 
of the program.  It held that EPA properly approved the state’s partial exemption of existing permitted uses from 
Tier 2 review, a provision allowing for a de minimis 10% reduction in the available assimilative capacity of Tier 2 
waters before Tier 2 review is required, and provisions allowing water quality trades without triggering anti-
degradation review.  Id. at 751-52, 767-70, 774-76.  f upheld 
122 Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. EPA, 268 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (D. Or. 2003). 
123 Id. at 1264-65 (quoting OAR 340–041–0026(1)(a)). 
124 Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)).  See also CORAlations v. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 2d 413 (D.P.R. 2007) 
(overturning EPA’s approval of water quality standards that lacked any methods or procedures to apply Puerto 
Rico’s anti-degradation policy to wetlands). 
125 Northwest Envtl. Advocates, No. 3:05–cv–01876–AC, 2012 WL 653757 (D. Or. Feb. 28, 2012) 
126 Id. at *19.  
127 Id. at *19. EPA argued that, although states are required to identify methods for implementing their 
antidegradation policy, those methods need not be contained in the state's regulation.   
128 Id. at *18 (citing PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 705 (1994)).  EPA 
interpreted this provision as disallowing “both unacceptable threats to uses and actual use impairment.” Id. 
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program must, at a minimum, not allow activities that could partially or completely eliminate any 
existing uses.”129 
  
 Some of the most significant programmatic challenges have involved nonpoint source 
pollution.  Judicial reactions to these challenges have been mixed.  When Montana’s legislature 
exempted nonpoint sources and other so-called “non-significant” activities from anti-degradation 
review,130 EPA directed the state to revise its program to protect the water quality of ONRWs 
from “even non-significant, permanent changes in water quality.”131 In American Wildlands v. 
Browner, EPA approved Montana’s subsequent proposal, which extended the anti-degradation 
program to all point sources but continued to exempt nonpoint sources (and mixing zones) from 
its requirements.132  In particular, Montana’s new provision exempted nonpoint sources from the 
anti-degradation requirements for Tier 2 waters “when reasonable land, soil, and water 
conservation practices are applied and existing and anticipated beneficial uses will be fully 
protected.”133  The Tenth Circuit deferred to EPA’s approval on the grounds that the CWA does 
not authorize EPA to regulate nonpoint source discharges.134   
 
 Conversely, in Northwest Environmental Advocates v. EPA, the court was unmoved by 
EPA’s assertion that it lacked authority to “review and potentially disapprove Oregon’s nonpoint 
source provisions as a part of its water quality standards review.”135  The court rejected 
American Wildlands, explaining that “many temperature impaired waters in Oregon are impaired 
in whole or in part by nonpoint sources of pollution, [thus] the challenged provisions could 
present a considerable obstacle to the attainment of water quality standards when, by law, the 
sources of pollution are deemed to be in compliance with water quality standards.”136  The court 
noted that one function of water quality standards is to achieve federally-approved water quality 
goals through both state controls and “federal strategies other than point-source technology-
based limitations,” and that “[t]his purpose pertains to waters impaired by both point and 
nonpoint sources of pollution.”137     
                                                 
129 Id.   
130 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-201(1)(c), 2-3-103 (1997). 
131 Brawer, supra note  , at 23-24, citing Region VIII EPA letter to Governor Marc Racicot, pp 3-5 (Dec. 1998)).  
132 American Wildlands v. Browner, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (D. Colo. 2000), aff’d, 260 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 2001).  
133 American Wildlands v. Browner, 260 F.3d 1192, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-5-
317(2)(b)).  This exemption did not apply to ONRWs.  
134 Id. at 1198.  See also Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 415 F.3d 1121, 1124 (10th Cir. 2005) (“the CWA does not 
require states to take regulatory action to limit the amount of non-point water pollution introduced into waterways”).  
But cf. Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 988 P.2d 1236 (Mont. 1999) (finding that a state statute 
exempting a gold mine’s discharges of arsenic-laced water into rivers that provided habitat for endangered species 
from the anti-degradation review process violated the state’s constitutional provision guaranteeing its citizens a right 
to a clean and healthy environment). 
135 No. 3:05–cv–01876–AC, 2012 WL 653757, at *9-10 (D. Or. Feb. 28, 2012).  Plaintiffs challenged several 
regulations that essentially exempted various nonpoint sources of heat pollution from complying with water quality 
standards from antidegradation review “so long as they do not increase in frequency, intensity, duration, or 
geographical extent.” Id. at *6. 
136 Id. at *7.   
137 Id. at * 10 (citing Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1130 (9th Cir. 2002)).  Pronsolino paved the way for this 
decision by finding that EPA's TMDL regulations “focused on the attainment of water quality standards regardless 
of the source of the pollution.”  Id. at *9 (emphasis added).  Disputes have arisen over the applicability of state anti-
degradation programs to other activities or over the kinds of waters covered.  See, e.g., W. Va. Coal Ass’n v. Reilly, 
728 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (S.D. W. Va. 1989), aff’d, 932 F.3d 964 (Table), 33 Env’t Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1353 (4th Cir. 
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  2. As Applied Challenges to Tier I and II Waters Issues 
 Other judicial challenges have focused on more discrete aspects of state anti-degradation 
provisions applicable to one or more of the three tiers of waters.  In some of these “as applied” 
cases, judicial interpretation has watered down anti-degradation requirements, such as in a pair 
of North Dakota cases involving approval of permits allowing phosphorous discharges into high 
quality waters because of the purported economic and social importance of the discharging 
activities.138   
  In other cases, the anti-degradation policy has constrained the issuance of discharge 
permits.139  Most commonly, courts have rejected permits for discharges into Tier 2 waters 
because of the absence of any finding of necessary economic or social development.140  
Permitting decisions that blatantly ignore the need to justify degradation of Tier 2 waters, then, 
are likely to be more vulnerable than decisions purporting to rest on a finding of necessity. 
 One court’s rejection of an environmental group’s attack on a state anti-degradation 
program regulation highlights the difficulty of reversing findings that economic necessity for 
degradation exists.141  The court upheld a regulation allowing a permit applicant to meet its 
obligation to provide “alternatives” to discharges into Tier 2 waters simply by showing that the 
project’s costs did not exceed a threshold for annualized costs.  The court characterized the rule 
as “a compromise between environmental and broader economic concerns [that] the judiciary 
                                                                                                                                                             
1991) (upholding EPA’s authority to object to state’s issuance of permit to coal mining operation that would involve 
use of streams for waste assimilation and treatment, in violation of the anti-degradation policy). 
138 See People to Save the Sheyenne River, Inc. v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 697 N.W.2d 319, 330-31(N.D. 2005) 
(upholding outlet permit for discharge into category 1 lake because the addition of phosphorus would not alter the 
beneficial use of waters, the agency adequately considered other, less degrading alternatives, and the agency 
determined that the outlet was part of a project designed to accommodate social and economic factors in the affected 
regions); People to Save Sheyenne River, Inc. v. N.D. Dep’t of Health, 744 N.W.2d 748 (N.D. 2008) (upholding 
modification of permit for lake outlet because it would not cause concentration of any parameter of concern to 
increase by more than 15%).  See also Community Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t v. State, Dep’t of Ecology, 149 
Wash. App. 830, 205 P.3d 950 (2009) (upholding general permit for confined animal feeding operations that 
required soil but not groundwater monitoring). 
139 See, e.g., Hughey v. Gwinnett County, 609 S.E.2d 324 (Ga. 2004) (invalidating issuance of a permit to a 
wastewater treatment plant because, even though the administrative law judge appropriately found the requisite 
necessity, the permit failed to meet the state anti-degradation policy’s requirement that the county use the best 
practicable treatment technology). 
140 See, e.g., Ill. EPA v. Ill. Pollution Control Bd., 386 Ill. App. 375, 896 N.E. 2d 479 (2008) (finding that the 
permitting agency’s record lacked data showing that the increased discharge was unavoidable or necessary, did not 
discuss other feasible alternatives that might have negated the necessity of the increased discharge, and did not 
contain information regarding the possibility of other methods to eliminate or reduce phosphorus and/or nitrogen 
before discharging wastewater into stream); In re Ciba-Geigy Corp., 120 N.J. 164, 576 A.2d 784 (N.J. 1990) 
(upholding challenge to permit due to absence of any finding of necessity); Fowl River Prot. Ass’n v. Bd. of Water 
and Sewer Comm’rs of the City of Mobile, 572 So.2d 446 (Ala. 1990) (invalidating permit for discharge of sewage 
due to lack of necessity finding).  See also Columbus & Franklin Cty. Metro. Park Dist. v. Shank, 600 N.E.2d 1042, 
1057-59 (Ohio 1992) (concluding that a state agency acted arbitrarily in deciding that degradation of water quality in 
a creek was “necessary to accommodate important economic or social development”). 
141 Ala. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 922 So.2d 101 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005). 
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should be loath to disturb.”142  The court reasoned that the state permitting agency needed the 
discretion to decide whether, at some level, the needs of the state’s people would be better served 
by placing upper limits on the costs of industrial plants than by “requiring massive and 
inefficient expenditures in order to achieve marginal improvements in water quality.”143 
 
In another case reflecting the anti-degradation policy’s potential to constrain discharges, a 
Montana agency declined to apply the state’s anti-degradation policy to discharges from a mine 
adit based on a regulation exempting “nonsignificant” discharges into Tier 2 waters.144  Had the 
policy applied, the discharges would have been subject to significantly more stringent controls 
and the process for reviewing the mine’s permit application would have entailed more public 
scrutiny.145  The Montana Supreme Court held that the agency’s unsupported statement that a 
perpetual discharge from the adit would always be sufficiently treated did not justify its 
determination that the discharge would be “nonsignificant.”146   
 
The same court upheld the state agency’s identification of two parameters for the purpose 
of making “nonsignificance” determinations, triggering the application of anti-degradation 
review to the discharge of coalbed methane produced waters.147  A federal district court, 
however, subsequently remanded EPA’s approval of the state rules adopting numerical standards 
for the two parameters because EPA failed to consider industry’s concerns about the lack of 
scientific support for the standards.148  In critiquing EPA’s explanation that the two parameters 
“may” be harmful, the court spuriously concluded, without any supporting rationale or citations, 
that “[a]pproving a state standard on the basis that a parameter may be harmful is certainly not 
what the Clean Water Act envisioned.”149  The court failed to recognize that the CWA reflects 
Congress’s intent to protect water quality against threats of uncertain magnitude, requiring, for 
example, that total maximum daily loads include “a margin of safety which takes into account 
‘any lack of knowledge concerning the relationship between effluent limitations and water 
quality.”150 
 
These cases indicate that, once a properly adopted state anti-degradation program is in 
place, states have considerable discretion to accommodate discharges into Tier 1 and 2 waters to 
promote economic and social goals, provided they comply with regulatory procedures and 
supply some evidentiary support for their substantive determinations.    
  3. As Applied Challenges to Tier III Waters Issues 
 
                                                 
142 Id. at 114. 
143 Id.  
144 Clark Fork Coal. v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Qual., 197 P.3d 482 (Mont. 2008). 
145 Id. at 489. 
146 Id. at 493.  See also Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Mont. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 234 P.3d 51 (Mont. 2010) 
(invalidating permits to coalbed methane production operation that authorized discharge into high quality waters of 
millions of pounds of sodium each year, even though high salinity levels already had impaired the river). 
147 Pennaco Energy, Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Envtl. Review, 199 P.3d 191 (Mont. 2008). 
148 Pennaco Energy, Inc. v.EPA, 692 F. Supp. 2d 1297, 1313 (D. Mont. 2009). 
149 Id. at 1314. 
150 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (2006). 
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Courts have been somewhat less deferential in reviewing permitting decisions that impact 
Tier 3 waters (ONRWs), at least when it comes to new or expanded uses with clear impacts on 
water quality.  In League to Save Lake Tahoe v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the court held 
that the Agency arbitrarily allowed additional mooring buoys, piers, and other forms of 
development in its shoreline ordinances.151  The ordinances would have allowed increased motor 
boating, which in turn would cause increased pollutant discharges and runoff into the Lake, 
which California had classified as an ONRW.152  Although the Agency proposed mitigation 
measures, including “no wake” zones, speed limits, and user fees, the court found that its 
determination that there would be no significant water quality impacts was arbitrary.153   
 
Along the same lines, a Minnesota court set aside a permit allowing a city to triple the 
capacity of a wastewater treatment plant and discharge nearly two million gallons of waste each 
day into an ONRW river.154  The state’s anti-degradation rules prohibited any new or expanded 
discharges into an ONRW unless there was no prudent and feasible alternative, and then only “to 
the extent necessary to preserve the existing high quality” of the receiving water.155  The court 
held that the state permitting agency failed to provide substantial evidence that the alternative of 
downsizing the treatment plant and using decentralized treatment was not feasible or prudent.156  
The court also held that the permitting agency erroneously restricted the discharge only to 
prevent degradation below ordinary water quality standards rather than to protect the existing 
high quality of the water.157  Finally, by failing to define the baseline existing quality of the 
water, the agency could not evaluate whether the proposed discharge would preserve existing 
high quality.158   
 
In a subsequent case, however, the Minnesota court rejected a challenge to a permit 
alleged to be in violation of Minnesota’s anti-degradation rules.159  An environmental group 
claimed that the state agency failed to consider the impact of the introduction of new invasive 
species through ballast water discharges into Lake Superior.160  The court deferred to the 
agency’s technical expertise that discharges need only be restricted “to the extent necessary to 
preserve the existing high [water] quality.”161 Although analysis of the impact of new invasive 
                                                 
151 739 F. Supp. 2d 1260 (2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part on other grounds, and remanded, 2012 WL 639264 
(9th Cir. Feb 29, 2012). 
152 Id. at 1292-93. 
153 Id. at 1286.  
154 Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. C’mmr of Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 696 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2005). 
155 Id. at 101. 
156 Id. at 105.  Cf. Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 660 N.W.2d 427 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2003) (invalidating general permit for stormwater discharges as violation of anti-degradation rules because the 
state agency failed to consider whether discharges were expanded). 
157 696 N.W.2d at 107. 
158 Id. at 108. 
159 In the Matter of a Request for Issuance of the SDS General Permit MNG300000 for Ballast Water Discharges 
from Vessels Transiting Minnesota State Waters of Lake Superior, 769 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009). 
160 The surrounding states and tribes have designated Lake Superior as Outstanding International Resource Waters 
or Outstanding Resource Waters.  See WIS. N.R. 102.10 (2008); MICH. RULE 98(7) (1999); MINN. ADMIN. 
7050.0180, 7052.0300(3) (2000); SOKAOGON CHIPPEWA WATER QUALITY STANDARDS 151.30(2) (2005), available 
at http://water.epa.gov/scitech/swguidance/standards/adeg/tribes_cwindex.cfm. 
161 Id. at 321. 
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species on the lake’s quality might have been prudent, the agency’s failure to address the risks 
associated with species that had already or might in the future arrive as a result of ballast water 
discharges was not arbitrary where the Lake had been “receiving ballast-water pollutants without 
restriction for as long as commercial vessels have operated on Lake Superior.”162   
 
Courts also have taken a deferential stance when environmental plaintiffs have attempted 
to use permitting decisions to expand the scope of a state’s anti-degradation policy.  In Port of 
Seattle v. PCHB, the court affirmed the agency’s certification that an airport runway project 
would satisfy the state’s anti-degradation policy despite potential impacts to stream flows in 
class AA waters, the equivalent of ONRWs.163  It seemed to take comfort in the fact that, under 
the state’s policy, the developer must offset the impacts of the project, even though it need not 
restore the AA waters to pristine condition.164 
 
 C. Anti-degradation Policy Deficiencies 
 
 The cases described above demonstrate that the CWA’s anti-degradation policy is neither 
fulfilling its potential for identifying and protecting high quality waters nor meeting the five 
goals delineated above in Part II.  These deficiencies fall into three categories:  (1) failure to 
ensure that high quality waters are properly designated; (2) failure to define “degradation” and to 
identify appropriate triggers for ensuring against it in the face of “important” economic 
considerations; and (3) failure to regulate all significant sources of degradation.  A fourth 
category—failure to detect inadequate anti-degradation plans and follow through with 
appropriate enforcement—becomes apparent from a consideration of on-the-ground 
implementation issues arising outside of the litigation context. This part explores each of these 
deficiencies, while reforms are proposed in Part V below. 
  1.  Designation Inconsistencies 
 
The EPA’s anti-degradation policy does not provide adequate guidance on how to 
distinguish Tier 1 from Tier 2 waters.165  EPA allows states to take either a pollutant-by-pollutant 
or water body-by-water body approach, with few substantive parameters.  Likewise, EPA’s 
definition of Tier 3 is illustrative rather than prescriptive, and its approach to state-by-state 
designation is wholly discretionary.166  Accordingly, some state regulations provide no 
procedural or substantive specifications whatsoever for designation decisions, leaving many high 
quality waters unprotected beyond the lowest common denominator—Tier 1. 
 
                                                 
162 Id. at 322. For similar outcomes, see, e.g., In re Louisiana Dep’t of Envtl, Quality Permitting Decision: Timber 
Branch II Sewage Treatment Plan, 2011 WL 1225985 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2011) (affirming agency’s decision that 
discharges of treated sewage would not degrade water quality in ONRW tributary ); In re Freshwater Wetlands Prot. 
Act Rules, 180 N.J. 415 (2004) (affirming New Jersey’s authorization of cranberry growing operations in the 
ONRWs of the Pinelands National Reserves). 
163  151 Wash. 2d 568, 90 P.3d 659, 681 (Wash. 2004). 
164 Id.  
165 See supra notes __ - __ and accompanying text.  
166 See supra notes __ - __ and accompanying text.   
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  2. What is “Degradation” and When is it Allowed? 
 
In addition to the designation vagaries described above, one key question is how to define 
“degradation.”  EPA’s regulations utterly fail to recognize the relevance of that question.167  EPA 
apparently allows states to limit Tier 2 protections to activities that result in “significant” 
degradation of water quality, invoking the agency’s inherent authority to avoid regulating de 
minimis environmental threats..168  State definitions of the point at which impairment triggers 
anti-degradation review are inconsistent.169  Moreover, as the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
Kentucky Waterways Alliance indicates,170 the anti-degradation policy fails to protect against 
cumulative effects of multiple discharges that impair existing water quality.171  
 
A related flaw is the failure to describe when Tier 2 high-quality waters may be degraded 
if “necessary” to accommodate “important economic or social development.”172  How necessary 
and important must the development in question be?  According to EPA, the phrase seeks to 
convey “a general concept regarding what level of social and economic development could be 
used to justify a change in high quality waters.  Any more exact meaning will evolve thorough 
case-by-case application” by the state.173  The burden of demonstrating economic necessity is 
supposed to “be very high.”174  However, state regulations differ markedly in how they apply 
this requirement.175  Absent constraints, this exception threatens to swallow the anti-degradation 
rule.176   
  3. What Pollution Sources are Regulated? 
 
In addition to the inconsistencies in defining “degradation” and “important” 
development, troublesome gaps have developed through the exclusion of certain pollution 
sources. In the intermountain west, for example, “the region’s anti-degradation policies are 
riddled with exemptions. The most common exemption is for existing sources—all eight states 
                                                 
167 Harleston, supra note __, at 57. 
168 Gaba, New Growth, supra note  , at 677.  See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Horinko, 279 F. Supp. 2d 732, 767-68 
(S.D. W. Va. 2003).  See also Kent Modesitt, Antidegradation: A Lost Cause or the Next Cause?, 2 U. DENV. 
WATER L. REV. 189, 217 (1999) (noting that EPA regional office supported the use of a significance determination).     
169 See Modesitt, supra note __, at 217 (noting that state approaches vary); River Network, supra note  , at 44 
(finding that five of the eight intermountain states “apply some sort of numeric, percent-based measure of 
‘insignificant’ degradation (often called de minimis degradation) that is allowable without review”). 
170 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
171 See Adler, supra note __, at 285. 
172 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
173 Qs & As, supra note __, at 8. 
174 Kalisek, supra note __, at 12 (quoting EPA, Water Quality Standards Handbook, at § 4.5 (2d ed. 1993)). 
175 River Network, supra note  , at 39-41; ADLER ET AL., supra note  , at 202; Katherine Zogas, Comment, The Clean 
Water Act’s Antidegradation Policy: Has It Been “Dumped”?, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 209, 229-30 (2008); Gaba, 
New Growth, supra note __, at 686. 
176 Stitts, supra note __, at 1359.  But cf. Ala. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Legal Envtl. Assistance Found., 922 So.2d 
101, 114-15 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (rejecting claim that portion of state program requiring showing of necessity for 
important economic and social development for new or expanded discharges to Tier 2 waters was void for 
vagueness).  Cf. Pacific Topsoils, Inc. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, 157 Wash. App. 629, 238 P.3d 1201 (2010) 
(rejecting contention that state anti-degradation program was unconstitutionally vague as applied to placement of fill 
material into wetlands without a permit). 
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‘grandfather’ existing sources, if they are not expanding their discharge.”177  Only a few states in 
the region—Arizona, Wyoming, and New Mexico—appear to meet EPA’s requirement that new 
and expanded discharges in tributaries of ONRWs be limited to those that will not degrade water 
quality.178  
 
Exceptions for nonpoint sources—existing or new—are equally widespread.  Although a 
few states, like New Mexico,179 Washington,180 and Florida,181 apply anti-degradation provisions 
to all sources of pollution in ONRWs, including nonpoint sources, many if not most states appear 
to have no restrictions on nonpoint source discharges whatsoever.182  As noted above, Montana’s 
exemption for nonpoint sources has been upheld,183 leaving high-quality waters in rural areas 
unprotected from the most significant sources of water pollution.184  
  4. Lack of Follow Up 
 
Beyond the lessons learned from several decades of anti-degradation litigation, it appears 
that some of the problems associated with implementation of the policy stem from the EPA’s 
failure to follow up after a state program has been adopted.  As evidenced by the GAO’s 
assessment of the Great Lakes Initiative (GLI), the lack of follow through turns in part on EPA’s 
failure to issue a consistent permitting strategy for the states.185  The GLI amendment to the 
CWA required that the eight Great Lakes states—Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New 
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin—include provisions consistent with EPA’s GLI 
guidance in their regulations and permit programs.186 But according to the GAO, the states’ 
permitting structures are not consistent with each other or with any overarching comprehensive 
strategy.  Moreover, EPA’s attempts to assess the effectiveness of the states’ anti-degradation 
                                                 
177 River Network, supra note  , at 44. 
178 Id. at 52-53. 
179 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
180 WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-201A-300(2)(e)(i), (iii); Hersh, supra note  , at 232.  
181 In Florida, “no degradation” of ONRWs and “Outstanding Florida Waters” is allowed, “notwithstanding any 
other Department rules that allow water quality lowering.” See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. 62-302.700(2)(a) 
(2006).  See Christie C. Morgan, Challenges and Opportunities in Protecting Outstanding National Resource 
Waters, 5-SPG Nat. Resources & Env't 30, 33 (1991) (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 17-4.242 (3)(b)).  
Interestingly, the Florida legislature specifically prohibited horticultural peat mining—a key economic driver in the 
state—in Outstanding Florida Waters.  WEST'S F.S.A. § 373.414(2)(d). 
182 See, e.g., River Network, supra note  , at 54 Tbl. 22 (listing Arizona, Colorado, Montana, and Nevada as lacking 
explicit nonpoint source controls); id. at 53 (“The manner in which the states have addressed nonpoint source 
pollution control varies dramatically in the [intermountain] region.”).  
183 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. See also Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-
Based Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water Pollution, 9 WASH. 
U. J.L. & POL’Y 21, 40 (2002) (“For [some] states, increases in nonpoint source pollution that impair existing uses 
would not be considered to violate state water quality standards or the antidegradation policy, so long as designated 
uses are fully supported.”). 
184 Blumm & Warnock, supra note __, at 108-09. 
185 U.S. GAO, Great Lakes Initiative, EPA Needs to Better Ensure the Complete and Consistent Implementation of 
Water Quality Standards, GAO-05-829, at XX (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/247244.pdf.  The 
1990 amendments to the CWA require the EPA to publish guidance for the Great Lakes states on minimum 
standards, implementation procedures, and anti-degradation policies for protecting water quality. 
186 Pub. L. 101-596, § 1,  104 Stat. 3000 (1990). 
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policies have been hindered by inadequate data.187  Even for priority pollutants, like dioxin and 
other bioaccumulative chemicals, sufficiently sensitive measurements have not been 
developed.188  
 
The GAO concluded that the GLI has limited potential to protect water quality for two 
primary reasons:  it focuses primarily on point sources, and it condones flexible implementation 
procedures, like variances, that relieve dischargers from stringent water quality standards.189  
Indeed, “the GLI allows the repeated use of some of these flexibilities and does not set a time 
frame for facilities to meet the GLI water quality criteria.”190  Moreover, the inability to reliably 
measure pollutant concentrations hinders the implementation of anti-degradation policies.191  
The GAO’s report advised EPA to issue permitting strategies that provide for a more consistent 
approach among the states and to gather and track information that can be used to assess the 
progress of implementing the anti-degradation policy and its impact on reducing pollutant 
discharges and improving water quality.192  
 
If the well-funded, well-coordinated Great Lakes Initiative has made so little progress, it 
should be no surprise that anti-degradation policies in other regions are lagging behind as 
well.193  As the River Network concluded in its report on the intermountain west, “[t]he power of 
anti-degradation is vastly underdeveloped.”194 
IV. A COMPARISON OF ANTI-DEGRADATION PROGRAMS AND PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT 
PROTECTION REGIMES 
 
                                                 
187 See U.S. GAO, Great Lakes Initiative, supra note  , at Introduction (“Attempts by EPA to assess GLI’s impact 
have been limited because of inadequate data or information that has not been gathered for determining progress on 
dischargers’ efforts to reduce pollutants.”). 
188 “Of the nine BCCs for which criteria have been established, only two—mercury and lindane—have EPA-
approved methods that will measure below those criteria levels.”  U.S. GAO, Statement of David Maurer, EPA and 
States Have Made Progress, But Much Remains to be Done if Water Quality Goals Are to be Achieved, GAO-08-
312T, at 2 (2008), http://www.gao.gov/assets/120/118778.pdf.   
189 U.S. GAO, Great Lakes Initiative, supra note  , at 3.  
190 U.S. GAO, Statement of David Maurer, supra note  , at 3. 
191 U.S. GAO, Great Lakes Initiative, supra note  , at 12, 20.  “For example, because chlordane has a water quality 
criterion of 0.25 nanograms per liter but can only be measured down to a level of 14 nanograms per liter, it cannot 
always be determined if the pollutant is exceeding the criterion.”  U.S. GAO, Statement of David Maurer, supra note 
, at 3. 
192 U.S. GAO, Great Lakes Initiative, supra note  , at  35-36.  A follow-up audit in 2008 concluded that accurate 
analytical methods and measurements are still lacking, and that the use of variances, mixing zones, and other 
“permit flexibilities” continues to hinder progress toward meeting the criteria.  U.S. GAO, Statement of David 
Maurer, supra note  , at 4, 7.  For a summary of EPA’s response to the GAO’s critique, see id. at 9. 
193 Congress appropriated $475 million for Great Lakes restoration in the 2010 Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. 
Law. No. 111-88.  For details, see CRS, EPA Appropriations for FY 2011, 25-26, 
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/R41149.pdf.  For analysis of the status of the nation’s waters more 
generally, see The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics and the Environment, The State of the Nation’s 
Ecosystems 2008: Highlights, 
http://www.heinzcenter.org/Ecosystems_files/The%20State%20of%20the%20Nation%27s%20Ecosystems%202008
.pdf (visited Feb. 3, 2012) (reporting on the continued degradation of U.S. water bodies and sediments by chemical 
contaminants and nutrients, especially from nonpoint sources). 
194 River Network, supra note , at 39. 
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Most federal public land management statutes include some sort of anti-degradation 
provision, ranging from outright prohibitions against impairment of the land and its natural 
resources to more lenient provisions aimed at protecting certain priority resources from 
destruction by incompatible uses.  This part considers an array of preservation-oriented statutes 
governing wilderness areas, National Parks, Wildlife Refuges, and Wild and Scenic Rivers, as 
well as two key conservation-oriented statutes that provide for sustained yields on lands 
managed by the National Forest Service and BLM.  These statutes may apply directly to waters 
covered by the existing CWA anti-degradation policy, especially Tier 3 ONRWs, many of which 
run through wilderness areas, parks, refuges, or other protected areas.   Even when the land 
management statutes do not themselves apply to waters covered by the anti-degradation policy, 
they may serve as models for mechanisms to strengthen the protections of the aquatic 
environments that are or should be covered by the CWA’s anti-degradation policy. 
 
 A. A Hierarchy of Protective Standards 
  1. The National Wilderness System 
 
The Wilderness Act of 1964 is the nation’s preeminent preservation statute.195  Today, 
federally designated wilderness areas are found within National Forests, National Parks, Wildlife 
Refuges, and lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management.  There are nearly 700 
wilderness areas in forty-four states, covering 109 million acres of land.196 
 The fundamental purpose of the Wilderness Act is to secure the present and future 
benefits of untrammeled wild lands for the public.197  To accomplish this goal, the Act specifies 
that wilderness areas shall be managed “in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future 
use and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for . . . the preservation of their wilderness 
character. . . .”198  It also directs the managing agencies to protect and manage wilderness areas 
“so as to preserve natural conditions.”199 
 In 1977, not long after the advent of the CWA’s anti-degradation policy, Dean William 
Hines called anti-degradation “the pollution control analogue to wilderness protection in public 
lands management.”200  In implementation, however, the Wilderness Act has proven far more 
protective than the CWA’s anti-degradation policy. 
                                                 
195 Sandra Zellmer, Wilderness, Water, and Climate Change, 41 ENVTL. L. XX, at *12 (forthcoming 2012); William 
Rodgers, The Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S. Environmental Law: Origins and Morphology, 27 LOYOLA L.A. L. 
REV. 1009-12 (2004).  
196 Russ W. Gorte, Wilderness: Overview and Statistics, Cong. Research Serv. Report No. RL31477 (2008). 
Excluding Alaska, wilderness areas comprise only two percent of the United States.  Id.  
197  Michael McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and Meaning, 45 OR. L. REV. 288, 309 
(1966). 
198  16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2006).  For descriptions of “wilderness character,” see Jerry F. Franklin & Gregory H. 
Aplet, Wilderness Ecosystems, in WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT: STEWARDSHIP AND PROTECTION OF RESOURCES AND 
VALUES 269-70 (John C. Hendee & Chad P. Dawson eds., 2002) [hereinafter WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT]; David 
N. Cole, Ecological Impacts of Wilderness Recreation and Their Management, in  WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT, 
supra. 
199 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (2006). 
200 Hines, supra note  , at  645.  Hines added:  “Because air and water are to an extent renewable resources, their 
degradation may not involve all of the problems of irreversibility that are raised in the destruction of other natural 
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To accomplish its preservation-oriented purposes, the Wilderness Act prohibits activities 
that would impair or otherwise detract from the wildness of wilderness areas.201  Permanent 
roads as well as commercial activities are strictly forbidden.202  With some exceptions, the Act 
also precludes motor vehicles, motorized equipment, mechanical transport, aircraft landings, 
structures, and installations.203  
 
The first exception is found in section 4(c), which provides: 
 
[E]xcept as necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area 
for the purpose of this [Act] (including measures required in emergencies involving the 
health and safety of persons within the area), there shall be no temporary road, no use of 
motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form 
of mechanical transport, and no structure or installation within any such area.204 
Courts have construed this exception relatively narrowly.205  In a case involving the Kofa 
Wilderness in Arizona, the Ninth Circuit enjoined the construction and maintenance of tanks to 
augment water supplies for bighorn sheep.  The court found that, although sheep conservation 
was undoubtedly a legitimate management objective, the tanks were installations that unlawfully 
trammeled the wilderness.  Although such installations might be useful to sheep threatened by 
drought and high temperatures, the FWS had failed to establish that they were a necessary 
minimum requirement for wilderness administration.206  The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar 
conclusion in Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, where it enjoined the Park Service’s practice of 
transporting tourists in a passenger van across the Cumberland Island Wilderness in order to 
provide access to historical structures.207  It rejected the Park Service’s argument that such 
services were “necessary” just because they made access more convenient and had “no net 
                                                                                                                                                             
environments.  Therefore, it might be expected that the policy would be applied most stringently when the 
threatened air and water resources either themselves are subject to irreversible damage or are inextricably related to 
other natural systems subject to such harm.”  Id. at 652-53. 
201 16 U.S.C. § 1131(b) (2006).  See Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 814 F. 
Supp. 2d 992, 1014-17 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (agencies that manage wilderness are “responsible for preserving . . . 
wilderness character”; “the Act is intended to enshrine the long-term preservation of wilderness areas as the ultimate 
goal”) (citing Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 629 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010)).  The 
principal author of the Wilderness Act, Howard Zahniser, viewed the term “wild” as synonymous with 
“untrammeled”: “not subject to human controls and manipulations that hamper the free play of natural forces.”  
Zellmer, supra note  , at *10. 
202 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2006).  See Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 353 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2003), 
as amended on reh'g en banc in part, 360 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 2004) (enjoining commercial salmon enhancement 
project); Barnes v. Babbitt, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (D. Ariz. 2004) (invalidating a plan that allowed repairs and 
maintenance of access routes as unlawful road construction). 
203 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c) (2006). 
204 Id.  (emphasis added). 
205 See Peter A. Appel, Wilderness and the Courts, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 62 (2010) [hereinafter Appel, Wilderness 
and the Courts]; Peter A. Appel, Wilderness, the Courts, and the Effect of Politics on Judicial Decisionmaking, 35 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (2011) (finding that courts are more likely to uphold wilderness-protective decisions 
than they are wilderness-impacting decisions).  
206 Wilderness Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 629 F.3d 1024, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1133(c)). 
207 375 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2004).  
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increase” in impacts to the land.208  Likewise, in Californians for Alternatives to Toxics v. U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service, a federal district court rejected the Forest Service’s argument that the 
application of rotenone was a necessary step toward the recovery of the Paiute Cutthroat 
Trout.209  It held that the agency neglected the well-being of other endemic species and 
unlawfully concluded that rotenone applications were necessary to preserve wilderness 
character.210   
 The second exception for otherwise non-conforming activities in wilderness areas, 
section 4(d), authorizes “such measures . . . as may be necessary in the control of fire, insects, 
and diseases.”211 The only published opinions directly on point involve the Forest Service’s 
efforts to control the southern pine beetle.  In the first of two related cases, the court remanded a 
proposal for extensive chemical spraying and logging as “wholly antithetical to the wilderness 
policy established by Congress,” and “hardly consonant with preservation and protection of these 
areas in their natural state.”212  The court explained that “[o]nly a clear necessity for upsetting 
the equilibrium of the ecology could justify this highly injurious, semi-experimental venture of 
limited effectiveness.”213  In the second case, the court upheld a pared down version of the 
proposal that used “spot control” logging to combat infestations.214 It approved measures that 
“fall short of full effectiveness” so long as they are “reasonably designed” to limit infestation.215  
It was careful to note, however, that the agency had significantly scaled back its plan and had 
adopted several preservation-oriented safeguards.216  
The Wilderness Act has been a significant factor in preventing the degradation of 
federally designated wilderness areas.217 Of course, there is room for criticism. Some 
commentators argue that, “managers have extensively manipulated wilderness to achieve desired 
ends.”218 But of all the federal land management statutes, the Wilderness Act provides 
sufficiently detailed standards to hold officials accountable and to enable concerned citizens to 
obtain relief through judicial review.  As Professor Peter Appel found, based on an empirical 
analysis of wilderness litigation in the federal courts: 
 
                                                 
208 Id.  
209 814 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D. Cal. 2011).  Rotenone is a powerful poison that kills everything with gills. 
210 Id.  However, where the agency makes extensive factual findings that otherwise incompatible activities, such as 
motorized access, are necessary to preserve wilderness character, for example, by aiding “the restoration of a 
specific aspect of the wilderness character . . . that had earlier been destroyed by man,” its decision may be upheld. 
Wolf Recovery Found. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 692 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1268 (D. Idaho 2010). 
211 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1) (2006). 
212 Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D.D.C. 1987). 
213 Id. at 43 (emphasis added). 
214 Sierra Club v. Lyng, 663 F. Supp. 556 (D.D.C. 1987).   
215 Id. at 560.   
216 Id. at 557-59. The Forest Service assured the court that the activities would not “unnecessarily sacrifice” 
wilderness values and were not aimed at promoting commercial timber harvest.  Id. at 560.  The court had found that 
the primary purpose of the agency’s previous plans for a large-scale eradication program were commercial in nature. 
Sierra Club v. Lyng, 662 F. Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1987). 
217 See Appel, Wilderness and the Courts, supra note ___, at 129. 
218 Gordon Steinhoff, Interpreting The Wilderness Act of 1964, 17 MO. ENV. L. P. R. 492, 501 (2010). See also 
Gordon Steinhoff, The Wilderness Act, Prohibited Uses, and Exceptions: How Much Manipulation of Wilderness is 
Too Much?, 51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 287, 294 (2011). 
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When agencies defend decisions that arguably threaten wilderness protection against 
challenges by environmental organizations, the agencies win only about 44% of the time.  
When agencies defend decisions against challenges that they are protecting wilderness 
too stringently, they prevail in approximately 88% of their cases.  This two-fold 
difference in success rates depending on the type of challenge indicates a significant 
difference in how courts approach wilderness decisions.219  
 
Appel described this phenomenon “as a one-way judicial ratchet in favor of wilderness 
protection.”220  His study demonstrates that the courts are more willing to give heightened 
protection to wilderness areas than to other areas covered by federal law.   
 
Although the Wilderness Act is not a complete analogue to the CWA, given its 
distinctive preservation-oriented edict for lands that are owned solely by the federal government, 
it can provide a few important lessons for improving the anti-degradation program.  The 
statutory prohibition against impairment, coupled with the directive to preserve wilderness 
character and natural conditions, gives agencies, courts, and citizens substantial powers to 
prevent degradation.  In addition, courts’ willingness to require “a clear necessity,” not just 
convenience, to invoke exceptions to the Act’s preservation provisions could serve as a useful 
guidepost for implementation of the necessity determination for degradation of Tier II waters.221 
  2. The National Parks 
 
One of the earliest expressions of an anti-degradation requirement in federal law is found 
in the National Park Service Organic Act of 1916.  The Act requires the Park Service to manage 
the national parks “to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife 
therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner . . . as will leave them 
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”222   
 
Over the years, the system has been wildly popular with the American public, and it has 
grown to include 397 national parks located in forty-nine states and several U.S. territories.223  
But the dual mandate of the Organic Act—to conserve park resources from impairment and also 
to provide for the enjoyment of them—poses a significant challenge for the Park Service, and it 
has not always prevented degradation of park resources.  Professor Robert Keiter explains: 
 
[T]he system has evolved over the years in a haphazard fashion, driven more by hard-
headed political calculations and attractive scenic features than by a sweeping 
commitment to preserving diverse ecosystems or key biological specimens.  In fact, even 
with their protective status, the existing national parks are not secure from outside 
                                                 
219 Appel, Wilderness in the Courts, supra note  , at 66-67. 
220 Id. 
221 See supra notes __-__ (describing Wilderness Watch v. Mainella, 375 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2004); Sierra Club v. 
Lyng, 662 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D.D.C. 1987)). 
222 16 U.S.C. § 1  (2006) (emphasis added). 
223 National Park Service: About Us, http://www.nps.gov/aboutus/index.htm (updated Nov. 2, 2011).   
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development pressures, which have disrupted wildlife travel corridors, fouled park 
waters, polluted regional air sheds, and altered surrounding landscapes.224 
 
In 1978, Congress passed an amendment to the Organic Act, which specifies that “[t]he 
authorization of activities shall be construed and the protection, management, and administration 
of these areas shall be conducted in light of the high public value and integrity of the 
National Park System and shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and purposes for 
which these various areas have been established, except as may have been or shall be directly 
and specifically provided by Congress.”225 
    
The Park Service construes the “no derogation” standard of the 1978 amendment as 
synonymous with the non-impairment standard of the 1916 Organic Act.226  The courts have 
concurred with this interpretation.227  Thus, in making decisions, the Park Service must “examine 
the duration, severity, and magnitude of the impact; the resources and values affected; and direct, 
indirect, and cumulative effects of the action.”228  If impairment would result, “the action may 
not be approved.”229  
 
The non-impairment requirement goes hand in hand with the Act’s broader 
conservation mandate.230  The Park Service states that the conservation mandate “applies all the 
time, with respect to all park resources and values, even when there is no risk that any park 
resources or values may be impaired.”231 The conservation mandate is further construed as 
requiring protection of “[t]he parks’ scenery ... wildlife, and the processes and conditions that 
                                                 
224 Robert Keiter, The National Park System: Visions For Tomorrow, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 71, 72-73 (2010). 
225 Pub. L. No. 95–250, § 101(b), 92 Stat. 166 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1) (emphasis added). This amendment 
unified the various natural, historic, and recreational areas of the system so that they would “derive increased 
national dignity and recognition of their superb environmental quality through their inclusion jointly with each other 
in one national park system preserved and managed for the benefit and inspiration of all the people of the United 
States. . .”  Id.  
226 NPS Management Policies § 1.4.2 (2006); 66 Fed. Reg. 56848, 56850 (Nov. 13, 2001).  
227 See, e.g., Sierra Club N. Star Chapter v. LaHood, 693 F. Supp. 2d 958, 965 (D. Minn. 2010); Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance v. National Park Serv., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1192 (D. Utah 2005); U.S. v. Garfield County, 
122 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1244, 1249 (D. Utah 2000).  See also Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 102 
(D.D.C. 2006) (holding that decisions granting applications for exemptions from directional drilling regulations 
were arbitrary and capricious because the Park Service failed to explain its conclusions that impacts from nearby 
surface drilling activities, such as air pollution, noise, light, water pollution, fire, or spills, would not impair park 
resources and values), appeal dismissed, 2007 WL 1125716 (D.C. Cir. Mar 30, 2007). 
228 66 Fed. Reg. 56848, 56850.  
229 NPS Management Policies § 1.4.7 (2006). See Terbush v. U.S., 516 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Whether an 
individual action is or is not an ‘impairment’ is a management determination.  In reaching it, the manager should 
consider such factors as the spatial and temporal extent of the impacts, the resources being impacted and their ability 
to adjust those impacts, the relation of the impacted resources to other park resources, and the cumulative as well as 
the individual effects.”) (quoting NPS Management Policies).  In Terbush, the court rejected a tort claim brought by 
the family of a deceased mountain climber under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006), which 
shields federal agencies from liability for discretionary activities.  It concluded that the Park Service had 
considerable discretion, grounded in the Act’s broad mandate to balance conservation with access and safety. 
230 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
231 NPS Policies §1.4.3 (emphasis added).  However, this provision goes on to say “the laws do give the Service the 
management discretion to allow impacts to park resources and values when necessary and appropriate to fulfill the 
purposes of a park, so long as the impact does not constitute impairment of the affected resources and values.”  Id.  
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sustain them ... including the ecological, biological, and physical processes that created the park 
... natural visibility ... water and air resources ...and native plants and animals.”232  
 
Where uncertainties arise, the conservation concept acts as a precautionary principle of 
sorts.  The Park Service recognizes that the “threshold at which impairment occurs is not always 
readily apparent,”233 so it has committed itself “to applying a standard that offers greater 
assurance that impairment will not occur . . . by avoiding impacts that it determines to be 
unacceptable.”234  It defines “unacceptable impacts” as those that would individually or 
cumulatively: 
 
·     be inconsistent with a park’s purposes or values, or 
·    impede the attainment of a park’s desired future conditions for natural and cultural 
resources as identified through the park’s planning process, or 
·    create an unsafe or unhealthful environment for visitors or employees, or 
·    diminish opportunities for current or future generations to enjoy, learn about, or be 
inspired by park resources or values, or 
·    unreasonably interfere with . . . the atmosphere of peace and tranquility, or the natural 
soundscape maintained in wilderness and natural, historic, or commemorative 
locations within the park. . . . 235 
 
The courts have generally agreed that “when there is a conflict between conserving 
resources and values and providing for enjoyment of them, conservation is to be 
predominant.”236 They tend to uphold the Park Service’s decisions to restrict access and usage in 
order to ensure against impairment of resources and thereby promote conservation.237  In one 
case, a court even found an affirmative duty to assert federal reserved water rights for a unit of 
the National Park System—a canyon—that required instream flows to maintain its ecological 
integrity and natural soundscape.238 
                                                 
232 Id. § 1.4.6. 
233 Id. § 1.4.7.1 . 
234 Id. 
235 Id. 
236 See Fund for Animals v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 92, 103 (D.D.C. 2003) (holding that NPS's adoption of final 
rule allowing 950 snowmobiles to enter Yellowstone and Teton National Parks each day was arbitrary and 
capricious), motion for relief from judgment granted, 323 F. Supp. 2d 7 (D.D.C. 2004), motion to amend denied, 326 
F. Supp. 2d 124 (D.D.C. 2004), appeal dismissed, 2005 WL 375622 (D.C. Cir. Feb 16, 2005). 
237 See Bicycle Trails Council of Marin v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1454 (9th Cir. 1996); Michigan United 
Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1991); Organized Fishermen of Florida v. Watt, 590 F. Supp. 
805 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff'd, 775 F.2d 1544 (11th Cir. 1985).  See also Keiter, supra note ___, at 87 (“When 
confronted with challenges to these recreational limitations, federal courts have consistently endorsed the Park 
Service's ‘resource protection-first’ interpretation of its legal responsibilities.”). 
238 High Country Citizens’ Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1245-46 (D. Colo. 2006) (stating that the 
Organic Act and the Wilderness Act imposed a legal obligation on the Service to assert reserved water rights 
because “the canyon was entitled to a quantity of water necessary to conserve and maintain in an unimpaired 
condition the scenic, aesthetic, natural, and historic objects of the monument, as well as the wildlife in the 
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However, the Organic Act’s dual mandate—to conserve resources from impairment 
while allowing public enjoyment—leaves the Park Service with discretion to balance the need 
for public access against the need to prevent degradation of resources. As the Ninth Circuit 
observed: 
 
[T]he so-called ‘impairment review’ . . . is explicitly recognized as involving a decision 
by the superintendent that calls for reconciling the ‘inevitabl[e] ... tension between 
conservation of resources on the one hand and public enjoyment on the other.’ This 
reconciliation calls for judgment on the part of the NPS. . . .239 
 
The court explained that the discretionary language of the NPS’s Management Policy “implicates 
the NPS's broader mandate to balance access with conservation.”240  Some commentators have 
argued that this dualism results in a type of immunity when Park Service decisions are 
challenged in court, compelling courts to uphold the agency’s decisions whether they tip in favor 
of recreation or conservation, even if the two conflict.241  Nonetheless, the Park Service’s 
relatively stringent definitions of “impairment” and “unacceptable impacts” could serve as useful 
guideposts in defining “anti-degradation” in the CWA context. 
  3. Wild and Scenic Rivers 
 The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (WSRA) of 1968 creates a nationwide system of wild, 
scenic, and recreational rivers.242  There are over 200 rivers, encompassing thousands of miles, 
in the Wild and Scenic Rivers System.243   
In the WSRA, Congress declared that “the established national policy of dam and other 
construction . . . needs to be complemented by a policy that would preserve other selected rivers 
or sections thereof in their free-flowing condition to protect the water quality of such rivers and 
to fulfill other vital national conservation purposes.”244 Thus, designated rivers must be free-
flowing and must also have “outstandingly remarkable” values (ORVs).245 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
monument, in order that the monument might provide a source of recreation and enjoyment for all generations of 
citizens of the United States”). 
239 Terbush v. U.S., 516 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2008). 
240 Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1132.  
241 See Denise Antolini, National Park Law in the U.S.: Conservation, Conflict, and Centennial Values, 33 WM. & 
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 851, 894-95 (2009) (citing Int’l Snowmobile Mfrs. Ass’n v. Norton, 340 F. Supp. 
2d 1249 (D. Wyo. 2004), which remanded a decision to restrict snowmobiling; River Runners for Wilderness v. 
Martin, No. 06-894, 2007 WL 4200677 (D. Ariz. 2007), aff’d, 593 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2010), which upheld a plan to 
provide extensive access to commercial boaters on the Colorado River in the Grand Canyon; and Davis v. Latschar, 
202 F.3d 349 (D.C. Cir. 2000), upholding a decision to conduct a controlled deer hunt in Gettysburg National 
Military Park). 
242 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271 et seq. (2006).  See Brian E. Gray, No Holier Temples: Protecting the National Parks Through 
Wild and Scenic River Designation, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 551, 552-58 (1988). 
243 National Wild and Scenic Rivers, http://www.rivers.gov/.  
244 16 U.S.C. § 1271 (2006) (emphasis added). 
245 Id. §§ 1273(b), 1276(d). 
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Upon designation, rivers are classified as wild, scenic, or recreational.  Wild rivers are 
“free of impoundments and generally inaccessible except by trail, with watersheds or shorelines 
essentially primitive and waters unpolluted.”246  Scenic and recreational rivers are also generally 
free of impoundments, but they are more accessible by road and may have some development 
along their shorelines.247  
 
Wild river segments, which like wilderness areas are “essentially primitive,” are highly 
protected.248 Rivers classified as recreational or scenic are governed by more lenient 
management standards.249  Regardless of classification, dams are prohibited,250 and designated 
rivers must be administered in a manner to “protect and enhance” their ORVs.251  Moreover, no 
federal department or agency may undertake or assist in any “water resources project” that would 
have a “direct and adverse effect” on a river’s ORVs,252 and deleterious projects may be 
enjoined.253  In a series of Oregon cases decided in the late 1990s, courts found that the BLM’s 
management of grazing practices violated the WSRA.  In Oregon Natural Desert Association v. 
Green, the court remanded the BLM’s management plan for failure to consider whether grazing 
would “protect and enhance” vegetative ORVs.254  Grazing was subsequently enjoined when the 
BLM’s plan showed the negative impacts of grazing on scenic and recreational values.255  
 
 Although the Oregon cases indicate a willingness to engage in probing judicial review of 
activities with undeniably detrimental effects on ORVs, courts have been inconsistent in 
reviewing challenges to the Comprehensive Management Plans (CMPs) for designated river 
                                                 
246 Id. § 1273(b)(1).  Like wilderness areas, wild rivers “represent vestiges of primitive America.” Id.  
247 Id. § 1273(b)(2)-(b)(3).  See Sierra Club v. Pena, 1 F. Supp. 2d 971 (D. Minn. 1998); Sierra Club N. Star Chapter 
v. LaHood, 693 F. Supp. 2d 958 (D. Minn. 2010). 
248 16 U.S.C. § 1273(b)(1) (2006).  See Wilderness Watch v. U.S. Forest Serv., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (D. Mont. 
2000) (hunting and fishing lodges not allowed on wild river segments that should “represent vestiges of primitive 
America”); Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Singleton, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1999) (grazing in wild river 
corridor permanently enjoined).  But see Riverhawks v. Zepeda, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1183 (D. Or. 2002) (finding 
that recreational activities may interfere with aspects of a wild river, but deferring to the agency’s balance of values 
that allowed motorboats continued access to the river). 
249 16 U.S.C. § 1273(b)(2)-(3) (2006). See Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton, 348 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(remanding the management plan for the Merced River for failure to protect and enhance the river’s geological, 
biological, and cultural ORVs and for failing to address impacts of visitor use); Sierra Club v. U.S., 23 F. Supp. 2d 
1132, 1140 (N.D Cal. 1998) (refusing to enjoin the Park Service from re-building a lodge and re-routing a road near 
scenic and recreational segments of the Merced River, and finding that the project would not impinge on ORVs but 
instead would improve accessibility and environmental conditions by moving buildings further from the river). 
250 16 U.S.C. § 1278(a) (2006).  See Swanson Mining Corp. v. FERC, 790 F.2d 96, 102-05 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (WSRA 
prevents FERC from licensing hydroelectric projects on designated rivers even if FERC believes there would be no 
adverse effects to ORVs).  
251 16 U.S.C. § 1271(a) (2006). 
252 Id. § 1278(b).  Such projects include water diversions, transmission lines, bridges, piers, levees, and boat ramps. 
See 36 C.F.R. § 297.3; Sierra Club v. Pena, 1 F. Supp. 2d 971, 980-91 (D. Minn. 1998) (a bridge that would result in 
changes to a river’s free-flowing characteristics was a “water resources project”).   
253 Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 1998); Sierra Club v. Pena, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 
980-91. 
254 953 F. Supp. 1133 (D. Or. 1997). 
255 Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Singleton, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1139 (D. Or. 1999); Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. 
Singleton, 47 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998).  But see National Wildlife Fed’n v. Cosgriffe, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1211 
(D. Or. 1998) (plaintiff failed to show facts that linked grazing directly to the degradation of ORVs). 
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segments.256  In Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Kempthorne, the court found that the lack of a 
comprehensive CMP warranted enjoining nine redevelopment projects in a designated river 
corridor.257  Conversely, in Center for Biological Diversity v. Lueckel, the court dismissed a 
complaint for lack of standing where the plaintiffs failed to show a causal link between the 
authorization of detrimental logging activities and the absence of a CMP.258  According to the 
court, there was “no evidence” that CMPs “typically provide for greater restrictions” than other 
types of federal land management plans.259 
  
Like the anti-degradation program, WSRA management restrictions seem to be 
underutilized tools.260  As litigants have found, broad-brush challenges to a management 
agency’s discretion to balance competing uses typically fail, but challenges that identify discrete, 
harmful activities that violate specific obligations to protect specific ORVs in a particular river 
segment may gain more traction.261    
  4. National Wildlife Refuges 
 
The National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act of 1997 (NWRSIA) sets forth a 
clear conservation mission for the System and the 545 national wildlife refuges included within 
it: 
 
The mission of the System is to administer a national network of lands and waters for the 
conservation, management, and where appropriate, restoration of the fish, wildlife, and 
plant resources and their habitats within the United States for the benefit of present and 
future generations of Americans.262 
 
                                                 
256 See 16 U.S.C. § 1274(d) (2006) (requiring CMPs within three years of designation).   
257 520 F.3d 1024, 1037 (9th Cir. 2008).  See also Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1252 (E.D. Cal. 1999) 
(“[W]here . . . an agency has egregiously violated a procedural planning requirement which is closely linked to the 
ability of the agency to adequately assess the impacts of future plans and actions on the river’s ORV’s, that 
procedural violation lends great weight to assertions that the substantive requirement to preserve and enhance the 
values for which river was included in the wild and scenic river system has been violated.”). 
258 417 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2005). See also In re Montana Wilderness Assn., 807 F. Supp. 2d 990, 1000 (D. Mont. 
2011) (rejecting argument that a plan’s purported failure to address motorized uses and user capacities violated the 
WSRA when the BLM had balanced competing values of solitude and recreation by imposing road closures and 
seasonal restrictions while reaffirming long-standing uses). 
259 471 F.3d at 540.  The court found no evidence that a CRP would provide greater protection than the existing 
forest plan, which stated that designated river corridors “will be managed to protect and enhance the values for 
which the river was designated.”  Id. at 540.  Indeed, the WSRA provides that, in cases of conflict between the 
WSRA and other land management statutes, “the more restrictive provisions shall apply.”  16 U.S.C. § 
1281(b) & (c) (2006).  
260  See Murray Feldman, William McLaughlin, & Jennifer Hill, Learning to Manage our Wild and Scenic River 
System, 20-Fall NAT. RES. & ENV'T 10, 70 (2005). (although the WSRA “provides a unique blend of conservation, 
development, and use for its river segment components . . . the managing agencies . . . are finding it difficult to give 
priority to wild and scenic rivers in these times of reduced budgets for resource management activities”). 
261  Feldman, supra note  , at 70. 
262 Id. § 668dd(a) (emphasis added).  See Robert L. Fischman, From Words To Action: The Impact and Legal Status 
of the 2006 National Wildlife Refuge System Management Policies, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 78 (2007) (describing 
the “ninety-six million acre network of reserves and easements dedicated to nature protection” within the System as 
“the nation's most valuable asset for ecological conservation”). 
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Thus, conservation is the first priority for wildlife refuges.263  The Act defines 
conservation as “to sustain and, where appropriate, restore and enhance, healthy populations of 
fish, wildlife, and plants.”264  In addition, it directs the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to 
administer the System to: 
 
(A) provide for the conservation of fish, wildlife, and plants, and their habitats within the 
System; [and] 
 
(B) ensure that the biological integrity, diversity, and environmental health of the System 
are maintained for the benefit of present and future generations of Americans. . . . .265 
 
According to Professor Robert Fischman, “One of the most noteworthy aspects of the 
1997 law is the relatively rich detail of the substantive management criteria, compared to 
previous federal organic statutes.”266  To achieve the conservation goals of the System, the Act 
allows only “compatible uses” that “will not materially interfere with or detract from the 
fulfillment of the mission of the System or the purposes of the refuge.”267  FWS regulations 
specify that the FWS “will not initiate or permit a new use of a national wildlife refuge or 
expand, renew, or extend an existing use of a national wildlife refuge, unless the Refuge 
Manager has determined that the use is a compatible use.”268  When any existing use is deemed 
incompatible, the FWS “will expeditiously terminate or modify the use to make it 
compatible.”269  
 
Economic uses of refuge resources—livestock grazing, mineral development, and other 
uses conducted for a profit—must satisfy an additional requirement.270  The FWS “may only 
                                                 
263 3 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 24:5 (2d ed. 
2007) (citing 16 U.S.C.A. § 668dd(a)(2)).  See 603 Fish and Wildlife Manual (FWM) 1.4(a), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/policy/manuals/ (“Refuges are first and foremost national treasures for the conservation of 
wildlife.”  Conservation will be achieved “[t]hrough careful planning, consistent Refuge Systemwide application of 
regulations and policies, diligent monitoring of the impacts of uses on wildlife resources, and preventing or 
eliminating uses not appropriate to the Refuge System. . .”). 
264 16 U.S.C.A. § 668ee(4) (2006) (emphasis added). 
265 Id. § 668dd(a).  An executive order issued by President Clinton characterizes the conservation duty as a “trustee 
and stewardship” responsibility:  “Fish and wildlife will not prosper without high-quality habitat, and without fish 
and wildlife, traditional uses of refuges cannot be sustained.  The Refuge System will continue to conserve and 
enhance the quality and diversity of fish and wildlife habitat within refuges.”  Exec. Order No. 12996, §§ (2)(b), 
(3)(e), 61 Fed. Reg. 13647 (1996) (emphasis added). 
266 Fischman, From Words To Action, supra note  , at 111.  See also Robert L. Fischman, Beyond Trust Species: The 
Conservation Potential Of The National Wildlife Refuge System In The Wake Of Climate Change, 51 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 1 (2011); Robert L. Fischman, The Significance of National Wildlife Refuges in the Development of 
U.S. Conservation Policy, 21 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (2005); Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge 
System and the Hallmarks of Modern Organic Legislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457 (2002). 
267 16 U.S.C.A. § 668ee(1) (2006). 
268 50 C.F.R. § 26.41. 
269 50 C.F.R. § 26.41(d). 
270 50 C.F.R. § 29.1.  The FWS’s  manual for wildlife refuges defines economic use as “[a]ny activity involving the 
use of a refuge or its resources for a profit.”  5 FWM § 17.6(D).  In a separate FWS policy, the term “refuge 
management economic activity” is defined as “[a] refuge management activity on a national wildlife refuge that 
results in generation of a commodity which is or can be sold for income or revenue or traded for goods or services.”  
603 FWM § 2 .6(N).  See Delaware Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Salazar, 2011 WL 4368512, *12 (D. Del. 2011) (finding 
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authorize public or private economic use of the natural resources of any national wildlife refuge . 
. . where the use contributes to the achievement of the national wildlife refuge purposes or the 
National Wildlife Refuge System mission.”271  
 
Under the FWS regulations, compatibility determinations are typically made as part of 
the comprehensive conservation plan (CCP) for each refuge,272 but “a refuge manager always 
may re-evaluate the compatibility of a use at any time,”273 particularly “when conditions under 
which the use is permitted change significantly, or if there is significant new information 
regarding the effects of the use. . . .”274  The FWS Manual emphasizes that the first goal of a 
CCP is “[t]o ensure that wildlife comes first in the National Wildlife Refuge System.”275   
 
Although recreational impacts could undercut the conservation mission, the statute 
identifies wildlife-dependent recreation as a preferred (compatible) use of the Refuge System.276  
As a result, in the past, “excessive weight [was] given to hunting and fishing.”277  However, 
according to Professor Fischman: 
 
[T]he text [of the new FWS Policy] . . . explicitly include[s] two of the substantive 
management criteria (compatibility; and biological integrity, diversity, and environmental 
health) as evaluative criteria for deciding whether to allow wildlife-dependent recreation 
programs. . . .  In the end, the Policy manages to make advancing the system mission of 
conservation, supported by the integrity-diversity-health mandate, . . . a higher priority 
                                                                                                                                                             
that a dune restoration project was not an economic use, where sand would not be sold but would be used to restore 
beaches and dunes). 
271 50 C.F.R. § 29.1.  See Delaware Audubon Soc., Inc. v. Secretary, 612 F. Supp. 2d 442 (D. Del. 2009) (enjoining 
decision to allow cooperative farming and farming with genetically modified crops in a refuge without first 
preparing a written compatibility determination); Stevens County v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 
1133-35 (E.D. Wash. 2007) (FWS’s determination that livestock grazing was not a compatible use was entitled to 
deference; although some studies showed the grazing could have a positive impact on habitat, other studies 
demonstrated the negative effects of grazing on migratory bird populations and riparian habitats, and site-specific 
studies demonstrated that grazing materially interfered with wildlife management on the refuge). See also 
Wilderness Soc’y v. Babbitt, 5 F.3d 383 (9th Cir. 1993) (remanding FWS’s decision to renew grazing permits where 
the FWS failed to consider the incompatibility of grazing with refuge purposes, even in the face of report of the 
refuge manager that current grazing practices were harming fish and wildlife habitats). 
272 See 50 C.F.R. § 26.41 (“We will usually complete compatibility determinations as part of 
the comprehensive conservation plan or step-down management plan process for individual uses, specific use 
programs, or groups of related uses described in the plan”).  
273 Id. § 25.21(f).   See id.  § 25.21(b) (“We may open a national wildlife refuge for any refuge use, or expand, 
renew, or extend an existing refuge use only after the Refuge Manager determines that it is a compatible use and not 
inconsistent with any applicable law”). 
274 50 C.F.R. § 25.21(f). 
275 602 FWM 3.3.A (2000), at http://www.fws.gov/policy/602fw3.html. CCPs are required by 16 U.S.C. 
668dd(e)(E)(2) (2006) and 50 C.F.R. § 25.12..  
276 See 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(3)(a)(iii) (2006) (“Wildlife-dependent recreational uses may be authorized on a refuge 
when they are compatible and not inconsistent with public safety.  Except for consideration of consistency with 
State laws and regulations as provided for in subsection (m) of this section, no other determinations or findings are 
required . . . for wildlife-dependent recreation to occur.”).  Wildlife-dependent uses include hunting, fishing, wildlife 
observation and photography, and environmental education and interpretation.  Id. § 668ee(1). 
277 Fischman, From Words To Action, supra note  , at 107-108.  See 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a)(4)(D) (2006). 
 38 
than promoting wildlife-dependent recreation.  Anything short of that would have run 
afoul of the legislation.278  
 
A potential deficiency in the statutory scheme is the failure to apply the compatibility 
requirement to the FWS’s own management actions.  In Fund for Animals v. Clark,279 the district 
court held that the FWS had no statutory duty to conduct a compatibility analysis of its feeding 
programs for bison and elk in the National Elk Refuge, because activities conducted by refuge 
managers were not refuge “uses” within the meaning of the Act.280  The court acknowledged that 
the statutory list of “uses” to be governed by the compatibility requirement (recreation, public 
access, easements, roads, and the like) “are not meant to be all inclusive,”281 but those uses 
“encompass a common ingredient . . . they are all ‘uses’ meant to be performed by third parties 
or the public.”282  It bolstered this conclusion by reference to § 668dd(c), which it construed as 
“specifically exempt[ing] from the compatibility requirement actions taken by ‘persons 
authorized to manage’ the refuge area.”283  The FWS has since adopted a regulation defining 
“refuse use” as use “by the public or other non-National Wildlife Refuge System entity.”284 
 
Fischman concludes that the stewardship responsibilities embedded in the statutory 
conservation mandate should guide decisionmakers to prevent impairment of Refuge 
resources.285  Courts have been willing to uphold FWS decisions to limit access to protect refuge 
resources,286 but they have been equally inclined to uphold FWS decisions to allow use.287  Thus, 
discretion can cut both ways.  Yet the NWRSIA’s directive to “ensure that the biological 
integrity, diversity, and environmental health of the System are maintained for the benefit of 
                                                 
278 Fischman, From Words To Action, supra note  , at 111-12 (citing FWM, supra note ___, pt. 605 § 1.13(B), § 
1.8(B), (D)(3)). See FWS, Final Appropriate Refuge Uses Policy, available at http://policy.fws.gov/ser600.html 
[PAREN]. 
279 Fund For Animals v. Clark, 27 F. Supp. 2d 8 (D.D.C. 1998).  
280 Id. at 12.   
281 Id. 
282 Id. at 11 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 6688dd(1)(A)-(B)).  A district court in Delaware found that a FWS dune restoration 
project was within the agency’s “sound professional judgment” and upheld the FWS’s compatibility determination, 
without analyzing whether the FWS was statutorily required to meet the compatibility requirement.  Delaware 
Audubon Soc’y v. Salazar, 2011 WL 4368512, *11-13 (D. Del. 2011). 
283 Fund for Animals v. Clark, 27 F. Supp. 2d  at 11 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 6688dd(c)).  Subsection 668dd(c) sets forth 
the general prohibitions against any persons disturbing or possessing “any real or personal property of the United 
States, including natural growth, in any area of the System,” or taking or possessing any wild animals within 
refuges, “unless such activities are performed by persons authorized to manage such area, or unless such activities 
are permitted . . . [as compatible uses] under subsection (d). . . .” 
284 See 50 C.F.R. § 25.12(a).  
285 Fischman, From Words To Action, supra note  , at 111. 
286 See Niobrara River Ranch, L.L.C. v. Huber, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (D. Neb. 2003), aff’d, 373 F.3d 881 (8th Cir. 
2004) (affirming FWS’s decision to limit recreational rafting and canoeing in a refuge). 
287 See Wilderness Soc'y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 316 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2003) (upholding a decision that a 
salmon aquaculture project within a refuge in Alaska was compatible with refuge purposes), reh'g en banc granted, 
opinion vacated, 340 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2003), amended on reh'g en banc, 360 F.3d 1374 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding 
that aquaculture project violated the Wilderness Act without resolving whether the project also violated the 
NWRSIA).  In Fund for Animals v. Hall, 448 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.D.C. 2006), the court found that the FWS violated 
NEPA (but not the NWRSIA) by failing to consider the cumulative impacts of recreational hunting in sixty refuges, 
but on remand, the FWS cured this defect by considering cumulative impacts in its revised refuge-level 
assessments.  Fund for Animals v. Hall, 777 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D.D.C. 2011). 
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present and future generations,”288 coupled with its compatibility requirement, could be useful in 
the effort to supply a meaningful definition of degradation under the CWA. 
   
  5. Multiple Use Lands 
 
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the Forest Service both manage the lands 
under their jurisdiction under a multiple use, sustained yield mandate that is less preservation-
oriented than the management regimes discussed above.  The organic statutes for these two 
agencies nevertheless provide some protection against degradation of certain resources, and 
therefore may be relevant to achieving the goals of the anti-degradation policy. 
 
   a. BLM Management of the Public Lands 
 
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA), the BLM’s organic act, 
requires that the BLM manage the public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained 
yield in accordance with land use plans (called resource management plans) developed by the 
agency.289  In addition, FLPMA requires that in managing the public lands the BLM “shall, by 
regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation 
of the lands.”290  The statute defines neither unnecessary nor undue degradation.291 
 
The BLM has defined those terms, but its interpretations have shifted over the years.  In 
1980, the agency adopted what became known as the “prudent operator standard” in its 
regulations governing hardrock mining on public lands.  That definition focused on what 
activities were necessary to mine rather than on the impact of mining on the environment.292  
The agency took the position that it lacked the authority to prohibit mining if the mine operator 
had complied with applicable requirements under statutes such as pollution control laws and 
acted prudently, even if operations resulted in environmental damage.293 
 
                                                 
288 16 U.S.C. § 668dd(a) (2006).   
289 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (2006). 
290 Id. § 1732(b). 
291 See Gregory M. Adams, Bringing Green Power to Public Lands: The Bureau of Land Management’s Authority 
and Discretion to Regulate Wind-Energy Developments, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 445, 470 (2007) (“[T]he vague 
UUD standard itself, undefined in FLPMA, hardly indicates how much degradation is ‘undue’ or ‘unnecessary.’”).  
Cf. Roger Flynn & Jeffrey Parsons, The Right to Say No: Federal Authority over Hardrock Mining on Public Lands, 
16 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 249, 281 (2001) (“The BLM’s duty to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation under 
FLPMA § 302 has not received close scrutiny or much clarification by the courts and has rarely been litigated.”). 
292 The 1980 definition provided in part that  “[u]nnecessary or undue degradation means surface disturbance greater 
than what would normally result when an activity is being accomplished by a prudent operator in usual, customary, 
and proficient operations of similar character . . . .” 43 C.F.R. § 3809.0-5(k) (1981).  The regulations specified that 
failure to initiate and complete reasonable mitigation measures might constitute unnecessary or undue degradation, 
and that failure to comply with applicable environmental protection laws would do so. 
293 One source described the prudent operator standard as follows: 
Stated differently, the “prudent operator” standard acknowledged that some environmental degradation was 
inherent in hardrock mining and that BLM would prevent only disturbance “greater than would normally 
result” from an operation conducted with due care. . . .   
John F. Seymour, Hardrock Mining and the Environment: Issues of Enforcement and Liability, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
795, 844 (2004). 
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In 2000, the BLM amended its mining regulations by redefining “unnecessary and undue 
degradation” to halt “conditions, activities, or practices that . . . result in substantial irreparable 
harm to significant scientific, cultural, or environmental resource values of the public lands that 
cannot be effectively mitigated.”294  The very next year, however, the BLM changed the 
definition again, concluding that the terms unnecessary and undue were equivalent to one 
another and represented a single standard, rather than two distinct statutory standards.  The 
agency took the position that as long as a mining activity was “necessary to mining,” FLPMA 
provided no authority for the BLM to restrict it.295  Some observers regard the 2001 definition, 
which remains in effect,296 as even weaker than the prudent operator standard.297 
 
 Environmental groups challenged the 2001 regulatory definition, taking issue with the 
agency’s view that the reference to undue degradation added nothing to the prohibition on 
unnecessary degradation.298  The district court in Mineral Policy Center v. Norton agreed with 
the plaintiffs that FLPMA requires the BLM to disapprove of an otherwise permissible mining 
operation which, while necessary for mining, would unduly harm or degrade the public land.299  
Congress sought to prevent not only unnecessary degradation, but also degradation that is 
necessary to mining but also undue or excessive.300  The court nevertheless upheld the 2001 
regulation as a result of the BLM’s commitment to exercise its discretionary authority to protect 
the public lands from unnecessary or undue degradation on a case-by-case basis in approving or 
rejecting individual mining plans of operations.301  Although the court characterized the question 
as “extremely close,” it  upheld the regulation.302 
 
 The courts have also addressed claims that the BLM violated its mandate to prevent 
unnecessary or undue degradation in approving particular projects or activities.  They have 
almost uniformly rejected those challenges, deferring to the BLM’s conclusions that activities 
such as off-road vehicle use303 and a major gold mining project304 would not result in 
                                                 
294 Flynn & Parsons, supra note ___, at 474. 
295 Id. 
296 The current definition of “unnecessary or undue degradation” under the BLM’s hardrock mining regulations 
provides: 
Unnecessary or undue degradation means conditions, activities, or practices that: (1) Fail to comply with 
one or more of the following: the performance standards in § 3809.420, the terms and conditions of an 
approved plan of operations, operations described in a complete notice, and other Federal and state laws 
related to environmental protection and protection of cultural resources; (2) Are not “reasonably incident” 
to prospecting, mining, or processing operations . . . ; or (3) Fail to attain a stated level of protection or 
reclamation required by specific laws in areas such as [Wild and Scenic Rivers or BLM-administered 
portions of the National Wilderness System,]. 
43 C.F.R. § 3809.5. 
297 Flynn & Parsons, supra note ___, at 475. 
298 Mineral Pol’y Ctr. v. Norton, 292 F. Supp. 2d 30, 40 (D.D.C. 2003). 
299 Id. at 42. 
300 Id. at 43. 
301 Id. at 44. 
302 Id. at 45. 
303 Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1985); Sierra Club v. Clark, 756 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1985).  The court 
in Clark admitted that the damage caused by off-road vehicle use in one area would be “severe.”  Id. at 691.  See 
also Gardner v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 638 F.3d 1217 (9th Cir. 2011). 
304 South Fork Band Council of W. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 588 F.3d 718 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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impermissible degradation.305  One court rejected the claim that the BLM’s renewal of a grazing 
permit violated FLPMA, relying on the BLM’s representation that it would monitor the potential 
impacts under adaptive management to prevent degradation.306  Noticeably absent was any 
requirement that the BLM actually commit to doing anything in the event that its monitoring 
efforts revealed that unnecessary or undue degradation was occurring. 
 
 The culmination of efforts to water down the unnecessary or undue degradation 
requirement may have come in the Ninth Circuit’s 2011 decision in Theodore Roosevelt 
Conservation Partnership v. Salazar.307  The issue was whether the record supported the BLM’s 
determination that conditions on the approval of expanded natural gas development would 
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation.308  The court reasoned that it had to view the 
nondegradation “standard in light of [FLPMA’s] overarching mandate” that the BLM manage 
the public lands using multiple use, sustained yield principles.309  It added that: 
 
While these obligations are distinct, they are interrelated and highly correlated. . . .  Thus, 
by following FLPMA’s multiple-use and sustained-yield mandates, the Bureau will often, 
if not always, fulfill FLPMA’s requirement that it prevent environmental degradation 
because the former principles already require the Bureau to balance potentially degrading 
uses—e.g., mineral extraction, grazing, or timber harvesting—with conservation of the 
natural environment.  If the Bureau appropriately balances those uses and follows 
principles of sustained yield, then generally it will have taken the steps necessary to 
prevent unnecessary or undue degradation.310 
 
The court essentially wrote the unnecessary or undue degradation standard out of the statute by 
concluding that management decisions that conform to multiple use, sustained yield principles 
will necessarily comply with the nondegradation mandate, too.311  In other contexts, the courts 
have refused to endorse interpretations of FLPMA that have the effect of sapping statutory 
language of all force.312 
                                                 
305 In one case in which the court found a violation of the unnecessary or undue degradation mandate, the court 
remanded a land use plan amendment that abandoned a proposal to acquire private land to protect wildlife as a 
means of offsetting recent land sales.  Because the court appeared to regard the violation as akin to a violation of the 
National Environmental Policy Act, it is not clear how much substantive content the court read into the unnecessary 
or undue degradation standard.  Soda Mountain Wilderness Council v. Norton, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1241 (E.D. Cal. 
2006). 
306 In re Montana Wilderness Ass’n, 807 F. Supp. 2d 990, 996 (D. Mont. 2011). 
307 661 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
308 Id. at 76. 
309 Id. 
310 Id. 
311 The court qualified its holding somewhat, stating that conformity to multiple use, sustained yield principles “will 
often, if not always” comply with the prohibition on unnecessary or undue degradation, and that such conformity 
“generally” will satisfy the nondegradation mandate.  Id.  It provided no hint, however, what management decisions 
would comply with multiple use, sustained yield principles but still violate the prohibition on unnecessary or undue 
degradation. 
312 See, e.g., Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1005 (D. Utah 1979) (stating that “if Congress had not intended to 
mandate two standards, it would merely have indicated that the Secretary was to continue to manage all lands so as 
to prevent unnecessary degradation.  If one takes the position that this is what Congress intended, then the language 
of impairment must be mere surplusage.  Statutory rules of construction are against such a finding.”). 
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 FLPMA includes a second provision that limits activities with the potential to degrade 
public lands and resources, but it applies to a narrower range of circumstances than § 302(b)’s 
unnecessary or undue degradation prohibition.  Section 603(c) requires the BLM to manage 
wilderness study areas (WSAs) on BLM lands “in a manner so as not to impair the suitability of 
such areas for preservation of wilderness,” subject to mining, grazing, and mineral leasing uses, 
provided that the agency shall “take any action required to prevent unnecessary or undue 
degradation of the lands and their resources or to afford environmental protection.”313  WSAs are 
areas identified in BLM inventories as having wilderness characteristics and which the President 
has recommended for official wilderness designation.314 
 
 The scope of § 603(c) is limited—it operates as a mechanism for ensuring that the BLM’s 
management of WSAs maintains the status quo while Congress considers whether to include 
those areas in the national wilderness system or release them for multiple use management under 
FLPMA.  During this interim period, the area must be managed (1) so as not to impair its 
suitability for preservation as wilderness, and (2) to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation or 
to afford environmental protection.315 
 
 The BLM has defined impairment of suitability in its hardrock mining regulations as 
“actions that cause impacts, that cannot be reclaimed to the point of being substantially 
unnoticeable” by the time the Interior Secretary makes a wilderness recommendation, or that 
“have degraded wilderness values so far  . . . as to significantly constrain the Secretary’s 
recommendation with respect to the area’s suitability for preservation as wilderness.”316  BLM’s 
management guidelines for lands undergoing wilderness review provide that “[a]ctivities that 
protect or enhance the land’s wilderness values or provide the minimum necessary facilities for 
public enjoyment of wilderness values are considered nonimpairing.”317   According to the BLM, 
the nonimpairment mandate focuses on the impact an activity has on an area’s potential for 
wilderness designation.318 
 
The agency has also taken the position that the existing uses exempted from the 
nonimpairment mandate are nevertheless subject to the prohibition on unnecessary or undue 
                                                 
313 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (2006). 
314 Id. § 1782(b); 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note ___, at § 25:12. 
315 See Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1078 (10th Cir. 1988). 
316 43 C.F.R. § 3802.0-5.  See also BLM, Frequently Asked Questions: Wilderness Study Areas, 
http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/blm_special_areas/NLCS/wilderness_study_areas/Wilderness_Study_Areas.html
. 
317 BLM, Interim Management Policy and Guidelines for Lands Under Wilderness Review (7/5/95) ¶ 8550.06.F, 
http://www.blm.gov/ca/pa/wilderness/wilderness_pdfs/wsa/ManualTransmittalShe.pdf [hereinafter Interim 
Management Policy].  Other activities will be regarded as nonimpairing if they are temporary uses (such as certain 
right-of-way grants) that do not create surface disturbance or involve permanent placement of facilities, provided 
they can be easily and immediately be terminated upon wilderness designation.  See, e.g., Colorado Envtl. Coal. v. 
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 932 F. Supp. 1247 (D. Colo. 1996). 
318 BLM, Wilderness Inventory Handbook: Policy, Direction, Procedures, and Guidance for Conducting Wilderness 
Inventory on the Public Lands (Sept. 27, 1978), 
http://www.blm.gov/ca/pa/wilderness/wilderness_pdfs/wsa/Wilderness_Inventory.pdf.  For an example of  a case 
finding a violation of the nonimpairment mandate in connection with issuance of a grazing permit, see W. 
Watersheds Project v. Rosenkrance, 736 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (D. Idaho 2010). 
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degradation.319   .  The courts have endorsed this position.320  The Interim Management Policy 
defines undue or unnecessary degradation in the WSA context to mean “impacts greater than 
those that would normally be expected from an activity” being conducted using best 
management practices or the best reasonably available technology.321  Failure to initiate and 
complete reasonable mitigation measures may constitute unnecessary or undue degradation, 
while failure to comply with applicable environmental protection statutes will necessarily do 
so.322  One court endorsed the position that “unnecessary” degradation is that which could have 
been avoided, while “undue” degradation is “that which is excessive, improper, immoderate or 
unwarranted.”323 
 
FLPMA’s unnecessary and undue degradation provisions are of questionable utility as a 
model for strengthening the CWA’s anti-degradation policy in light of judicial decisions that 
weaken its force, if not completely obliterate it as a constraint on management discretion.  
Section 603(c)’s nonimpairment mandate is clearly more restrictive.  As one federal district court 
noted, “[t]he word ‘impair’ would prevent many activities that would not be prevented by the 
language of ‘unnecessary or undue degradation.”324  For example, carefully conducted 
commercial timber harvesting would not result in unnecessary or undue degradation, but might 
impair wilderness characteristics.  Although FLPMA’s nonimpairment mandate represents a 
temporary protection pending congressional action on wilderness recommendations, there is 
nothing in the standard that is inherently inconsistent with a more permanent application in other 
contexts.  If the mandate were incorporated into the CWA anti-degradation policy, it might be 
phrased to prohibit discharges that (1) degrade water quality to a degree that precludes 
reclamation to the point of being substantially unnoticeable, or (2) render a water body 
unsuitability for fishable/swimmable and higher uses.  It is not clear whether the first constraint 
would eliminate the problems that the current policy poses in failing to define what amounts to 
“significant” degradation.  In addition, it would fail to require restoration of impaired high 
quality waters.325  The second constraint appears to restate the prohibitions on impairment 
reflected in the existing anti-degradation policy.  Thus, FLPMA is not an ideal model for 
strengthening the anti-degradation policy. 
  b. Management of the National Forests 
 
  The National Forest Management Act of 1976 (NFMA) includes management and 
planning provisions to guide the Forest Service in seeking an appropriate mix of uses in the 
                                                 
319 43 C.F.R. § 3802.0-6.  See also Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass’n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 739 (10th Cir. 1982); 
Memorandum to Secretary from Solicitor, BLM Wilderness Review – Section 603, Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act, at 34-35 (Sept. 5, 1978). 
320 The point is moot if this version of the unnecessary and undue degradation mandate, like the more generally 
applicable version in § 1732(b), is subsumed by the multiple use, sustained yield management standard.  Compare 
Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1005 (D. Utah 1979) (holding that the BLM may regulate lands under § 603(c) 
subject to an existing use “so as to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the environment”), with Theodore 
Roosevelt Conservation Partnership (discussed at supra note   and accompanying text). 
321 Interim Management Policy, supra note ____, at ¶ 8550.06.G. 
322 Id. 
323 Utah v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 995, 1005 n.13 (D. Utah 1979). 
324 Id. at 1005. 
325 For discussion of how the anti-degradation policy might be amended to require restoration, see infra notes ___-
___ and accompanying text. 
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National Forest System.326  Like FLPMA, the statute embraces multiple use, sustained yield 
principles, and explicitly recognizes “outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, wildlife and 
fish, and wilderness” as appropriate forest uses.327 
 
NFMA’s provisions include few parallels to the anti-degradation policy.  The statute 
requires forest plans to “ensure research and evaluation of effects of each management system to 
assure no substantial and permanent impairment of land productivity.”328 In addition, forest plans 
must prevent irreversible damage to soil, slope, or other watershed conditions and protect 
streams and other bodies of water from detrimental changes if harvests are likely to seriously and 
adversely affect water conditions or fish habitat.”329  According to the courts, the need to balance 
these protections while providing for multiple uses of the forests “is just the type of policy-
oriented decision Congress wisely left to the discretion of the experts—here, the Forest 
Service.”330  As a result, the courts have been loath to upset the multiple-use sustained-yield 
agenda.331 
 
NFMA also requires that forest plans “provide for diversity of plant and animal 
communities.”332  This vague provision imposes weak constraints on Forest Service 
discretion.333  With a few notable exceptions,334 the courts have generally refused to require any 
precise level of diversity.  As one court put it, “[t]he agency’s judgment in assessing issues 
requiring a high level of technical expertise, such as diversity, must ... be accorded the 
considerable respect that matters within the agency's expertise deserve.”335  The Forest Service 
has amended the regulations that implement the diversity requirement more than once, with some 
versions containing more specific constraints on forest management than others.336  Although the 
                                                 
326 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600 et seq. (2006). 
327 16 U.S.C. §1604(e)(1) (2006).  Mineral resources are recognized as appropriate uses in id. §§ 528 and § 478. 
328 Id. § 1604(g)(3)(C) (emphasis added). 
329  Id. § 1604(g)(3)(E)(i) and (iii). 
330 Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792, 800 (5th Cir. 1994). 
331 Id.; Lamb v. Thompson, 265 F.3d 1038, 1048-50 (10th Cir. 2001); Wilderness Soc’y v. Thomas, 188 F.3d 1130, 
1136 (9th Cir. 1999); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
332 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B) (2006).  
333 3 COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note  , at § 34:15. 
334 E.g., Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1473 (W.D. Wash. 1992), aff'd, 998 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 
1993) (enjoining timber sales on grounds that the diversity duty requires planning for the entire biological 
community, such that a management plan that would preserve a management indicator species such as the owl, only 
to exterminate other species, would conflict with the duty); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Moseley, 798 F. Supp. 1484 
(W.D. Wash. 1992) (similar). 
335 Sierra Club v. Robertson, 810 F. Supp. 1021, 1028 (W.D. Ark. 1992), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other 
grounds, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994).  See also Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792, 800 (5th Cir. 1994) (concluding 
that the protection of diversity “means something less than preservation of the status quo but something more than 
eradication of species”). 
336 From 1982 to 2005, the Forest Service’s regulations implementing NFMA’s diversity provision required 
sufficient habitat to support “a minimum number of reproductive individuals . . . well distributed so that those 
individuals can interact with others in the planning area.”  36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1982).  In 2005, the regulation was 
replaced with much more general provisions on ecological, social, and economic sustainability.  36 C.F.R. §§ 
219.10, 219.19-.21 (2011).  In 2012, the agency amended its planning regulations again.  The new version adopts “a 
complementary ecosystem and species-specific approach to maintaining the diversity of plant and animal 
communities and the persistence of native species in the plan area.”  Final Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 21162, 21212 (Apr. 9, 
2012) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219.9(a)).  Among other things, the regulations require each forest plan to 
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courts have been more willing to enjoin timber harvests and other projects that would diminish 
viable populations under the more detailed versions, by and large they have deferred to the 
agency’s discretionary decisions in applying the regulations.337 
 
Some WSAs within the National Forest System are subject to a requirement somewhat 
similar to that found in FLPMA, depending on the specific language of the statewide wilderness 
act. For example, Montana’s Wilderness Act requires the Forest Service “to maintain” the 
wilderness character as it existed on the date of enactment [1977].”338  In Russell Country 
Sportsmen, the Ninth Circuit held that this mandate gave the agency the authority not only to 
maintain but also to enhance the wild, natural characteristics by closing off pre-existing routes to 
motor vehicles.339   
 
NFMA and its implementing regulations impose some constraints on management 
decisions that threaten to degrade sensitive wildlife, plants, and water quality.  The general 
nature of these constraints, and the judicial reluctance in many cases to rely on them to halt 
timber, grazing, and other projects detrimental to resource integrity, make them poor models for 
strengthening the CWA’s anti-degradation policy.  And the more stringent constraints on 
approval of activities that would adversely affect WSAs derive from state-specific wilderness 
legislation rather than from NFMA.  Yet by focusing on ecosystem characteristics and biological 
communities, NFMA’s diversity regulations can provide useful guidance for defining 
degradation and for identifying, restoring, and maintaining the integrity of important aquatic 
ecosystems, especially those with “exceptional ecological significance,” through anti-
degradation requirements. 
 
B. The Lessons of Federal Lands for Protecting Water Resources Against 
Degradation 
 
Among the federal land management statutes discussed in the previous section, the Park 
Service Organic Act and the NWRSIA seem to provide the most appropriate guidance for 
strengthening the CWA’s anti-degradation requirements.  Although the Wild and Scenic Rivers 
Act can supply some lessons for the CWA, its aspirations for maintaining free-flowing rivers are 
                                                                                                                                                             
include standards or guidelines “to maintain or restore the diversity of ecosystems and habitat types throughout the 
plan area,” including components to maintain or restore “(i) Key characteristics associated with terrestrial and 
aquatic ecosystem types; (ii) Rare aquatic and terrestrial plant and animal communities; and (iii) The diversity of 
native tree species similar to that existing in the plan area.”  Id. at 21213 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 219.9(a)(2)).  
It remains to be seen whether the 2012 regulations meaningfully constrain agency discretion. 
337 See, e.g., Forest Guardians v. U.S. Forest Serv., 641 F.3d 423, 440-43 (10th Cir. 2011) (upholding the agency’s 
approval of a timber sale even though population levels for a management indicator species were below the 
minimum viable population threshold and were declining, and the project called for destruction of additional 
habitat).  
338 Montana Wilderness Study Act, Pub. L. No.  95–150, § 3(a), 91 Stat. 1243 (1977). 
339 Russell Country Sportsmen v. U.S. Forest Serv., 668 F.3d 1037, 1042-44 (9th Cir. 2011).  Although the court 
reasoned that “[t]he Act simply requires the Service to preserve a study area’s wilderness character against decline,” 
it found that “[e]nhancement of wilderness character is fully consistent with the Study Act’s mandate, although the 
Study Act does not require it.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  Id. at 1042.  The Idaho district court reached a similar 
conclusion under the Wyoming Wilderness Act in Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Timchak, 2006 WL 3386731, *3-6 
(D. Idaho 2006), overturning a decision to permit increased heli-skiing in a WSA because the Service failed to show 
that available opportunities for solitude would be maintained despite the increased use. 
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not as specific with respect to anything but dams as the nonimpairment provisions of those other 
two laws, nor are its provisions as closely related to protecting the biological, chemical, or 
physical integrity of the system.  As a result it remains an underutilized tool and, arguably, a less 
optimal analogue.  The Wilderness Act already protects the components of high quality waters 
that run through federally designated wilderness areas by prohibiting, with limited exceptions, 
activities that would detract from wilderness values, including commercial activities that might 
otherwise threaten water quality.  The Act provides a less than ideal model for protecting high 
quality waters outside the boundaries of wilderness areas, however, because a ban on all 
discharges from industrial and commercial activities would impose unrealistic constraints that 
upset the balance between environmental protection and economic growth that Congress 
endorsed in 1987 by codifying EPA’s existing anti-degradation policy.  As for the multiple-use 
statutes, FLPMA and NFMA, with a few caveats, they are not particularly helpful to efforts to 
strengthen the anti-degradation policy for reasons described above.340 
 
The Park Service Organic Act’s goals and mandates could be tailored to provide 
appropriately enhanced protection for the nation’s high quality waters.  The Act aims “to 
conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wildlife therein and to provide 
for the enjoyment of the same in such manner . . . as will leave them unimpaired for the 
enjoyment of future generations.”341  NPS Policies recognize that conservation of plants and 
animals presently and on into the future entails protecting not just individual species but 
maintaining them “as parts of the natural ecosystems of parks.”342  The Service also sees the 
conservation of “evolving genetic diversity” as part of its mission.343  The anti-degradation 
policy could be amended to define “degradation” as impairment of water quality in a covered 
water body that either results in loss or threatened loss of an existing use – especially fishing, 
swimming, or higher uses – or adversely affects the ecological resilience of the water body, such 
that its capacity to continue to provide important ecosystem services is reduced.  Such a dual 
standard would measure degradation by two yardsticks, one that focuses on suitability for 
particular human uses and another that focuses on the role of the affected water body in the 
ecosystem of which it is a part. 
 
Yet the Organic Act is not perfect, and impairment of species within the National Park 
System has occurred.  Like the rest of North America, the System has experienced sharp declines 
in the diversity and abundance of animal and plant species.344  The culprits are found, for the 
                                                 
340 See supra notes ___-___ and ___-___ and accompanying text. 
341 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
342 Management Policies, supra note ___, at § 4.4.1.  See id. § 1.4.7.2 (“The Service will also strive to ensure that 
park resources and values are passed on to future generations in a condition that is as good as, or better than, the 
conditions that exist today.”). 
343 Id. §4.4.1.2.  “The Service will strive to protect the full range of genetic types (genotypes) of native plant and 
animal populations in the parks by perpetuating natural evolutionary processes and minimizing human interference 
with evolving genetic diversity.”  Id.  Compare  NWRSIA, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (2006) (explicitly recognizing 
“restoration of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources and their habitats” as a mission of the National Wildlife Refuge 
System “where appropriate”).  
344 See National Park Service Science in the 21st Century: A National Parks Science Committee Report to the 
National Park System Advisory Board D-1589A at 1 (2d ed. 2009) (observing that “national parks with decreased 
biological diversity and diminished natural systems can in no way be considered unimpaired,” and arguing that 
establishing a “fully constituted science program” is essential to the nonimpairment mandate).  See also Debra L. 
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most part, outside of park boundaries on adjacent federal, state, and private lands.  Such 
“external threats . . . could destabilize park wildlife populations and critical ecosystem services, 
such as clean water and flood control.”345  In particular, a 2009 National Parks Science 
Committee Report observed that “the Park Service should provide far greater protection for 
freshwater and marine systems” if it is to remain a “haven . . . for once-widespread species and 
ecosystems.”346  The “external threats” problem is relevant to the anti-degradation policy 
because a Tier 3 river that runs through a wilderness area, for example, may have segments that 
are not given Tier 3 protections, and thus can be degraded in ways that adversely affect the Tier 
3 segment.347 
 
Still, water quality within the boundaries of the National Park System seems to be at least 
somewhat better than outside of the System.  In 1993, the Park Service established a nationwide 
goal that by 2008 more than 99 percent of streams and rivers managed by the Service would 
meet state and federal water quality standards adopted under the CWA.348  To achieve this goal, 
the Service, in partnership with the U.S. Geological Survey, has devoted attention to preparing 
inventories of water quality in Park units.  Not surprisingly, water quality within and among park 
units varies significantly, making generalizations difficult. For example, water bodies within 
Yellowstone National Park “continue to be of high quality.”349 In the more populous Mid-
Atlantic Region, which includes ten units in Pennsylvania and Virginia, 21 percent of the 
ONRWs were impaired, and none had attained all of their designated uses.350  System-wide, the 
Park Service has fallen short of its 99 percent water quality compliance goal, but it appears to be 
taking steps in the right direction under the Organic Act and, where applicable, the ONRW 
provisions of the anti-degradation policy.351  The existence of significant noncompliance even in 
ONRWs, however, highlights the need for the imposition of restoration responsibilities on states 
whose high quality waters violate water quality standards or other aspects of the anti-degradation 
policy. 
 
 The NWRSIA can serve as another appropriate guidepost for improving the CWA’s anti-
degradation program.  In one sense, at least, it may be even more useful than the Park Service 
Organic Act.  Economic uses of wildlife refuges may be allowed, but the stewardship 
responsibilities embedded in the Refuge Act’s conservation mandate require decisionmakers to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Donahue, Trampling the Public Trust, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 257, 264-65 (2010) (describing how the loss of a 
top predator has had devastating ripple effects in Yellowstone, Yosemite, Wind Cave, Zion, and Olympic National 
Parks and in Jasper National Park in Canada). 
345 Keiter, supra  note ___, at 91. 
346 National Parks Science Committee Report, supra note  , at 3. 
347 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) (approving discharge by sewage treatment facility into a 
portion of the Illinois River in Arkansas that is upstream from a segment within Oklahoma that had been designated 
as a scenic river). 
348 Water Quality Monitoring in the Mid-Atlantic Network of the National Park Service, App. 4, p. 15 (Oct. 1, 2005) 
(citing Goal Ia4A).   
349 NPS, Project Reports for Water Quality Monitoring for Parks in the NPS Greater Yellowstone Network ix (2009), 
NPS 960/110571 (September 2011), available at http://www.greateryellowstonescience.org/subproducts/214/7. 
350 Water Quality Monitoring in the Mid-Atlantic Network, supra note  , at 2.  
351 NPS, Water Quality Program, http://www.nature.nps.gov/water/waterquality/ (last updated Feb. 2, 2012).  See 
also NPS, Baseline Water Quality Data Inventory & Analysis Reports, http://www.nature.nps.gov/water/horizon.cfm 
(visited Feb. 3, 2012). 
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prevent economic uses and recreational uses from impairing Refuge resources.352  The statute 
unequivocally directs the FWS “to sustain and, where appropriate, restore and enhance, healthy 
populations of fish, wildlife, and plants.”353  Like the Organic Act, the Refuge Act promotes 
biological diversity and integrity of the system, but it includes more substantive management 
criteria with “relatively rich detail.”354  The Refuge Management Policy adds even more detail.  
As Professor Fischman observed, “the Policy manages to make advancing the system mission of 
conservation, supported by the integrity-diversity-health mandate, among others, a higher 
priority than promoting wildlife-dependent recreation.”355  This level of detail cabins the 
agency’s discretion, and empowers citizens and courts to ensure implementation of the Act’s 
conservation/non-impairment requirement.  Drawing on the NWRSIA example, the CWA’s anti-
degradation policy could declare the issuance of permits involving discharges of specified 
pollutants (or amounts of pollutants) to be incompatible (or presumptively incompatible) with 
maintenance of the high quality waters protected by the policy.356  The policy could distinguish 
among the tiers of water bodies by limiting this approach to new or expanded discharges into 
Tier 1 waters, but extending it to all discharges, including existing discharges, for Tier 3 (and 
perhaps Tier 2) waters.  This approach resembles the prohibition in FWS regulations on approval 
of certain uses of the wildlife refuges absent a showing of compatibility.357 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
  
Building on forty years of experience with the CWA’s anti-degradation policy, and on the 
comparative strengths and weaknesses of federal land management statutes, we offer four 
recommendations to improve the anti-degradation policy.  Each of the recommendations 
responds to one of the deficiencies in the anti-degradation program identified in Part III.C above.  
 
First, we recommend a federal regulation requiring states to designate ONRWs in their 
WQS inventories, including waters within national parks and wildlife refuges and other waters of 
“exceptional ecological significance.”358  The current regulations fail to provide any direction 
regarding the designation processes, beyond referencing parks and refuges; as a result, there is 
inadequate protection for some of the nation’s most important aquatic resources.359  In 1998, 
EPA suggested in an advance notice of proposed rulemaking that States and tribes should be 
required to establish a nomination process with criteria guidelines so that interested citizens or 
                                                 
352 See supra notes __-__ and accompanying text. 
353 16 U.S.C.A. § 668ee(4) (2006) (emphasis added). 
354 Fischman, supra note  , at 111.  
355 Fischman, supra note  , at 111-12, citing Fish & Wildlife Manual, supra note __, pt. 605 § 1.13(B), § 1.8(B), 
(D)(3). See FWS, Final Appropriate Refuge Uses Policy, available at http://policy.fws.gov/ser600.html. 
356 Under the presumptive incompatibility approach, the burden would shift to permit applicants to demonstrate that 
discharge of the pollutants or amounts involved would not result in impermissible degradation, and therefore would 
be compatible with the policy. 
357 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
358 See 63 Fed. Reg. at 36,786.  EPA defines “waters of exceptional ecological significance” as those “water bodies 
which are important, unique, or sensitive ecologically, but whose water quality, as measured by the traditional 
characteristics (dissolved oxygen, pH, etc.) may not be particularly high, such as thermal springs.  Waters of 
exceptional ecological significance also include waters whose characteristics cannot adequately be described by 
these parameters.”  48 Fed. Reg. 51400, 51403 (Nov. 8, 1983).  See also Brawer, supra note  , at 20-21 
(recommending more well-defined processes for citizen petition and designation of ONRWs). 
359 Adler, supra note __, at 287. 
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groups could petition for designation of certain waters as ONRWs.360 The New Mexico 
experience demonstrates how public involvement can promote the process of protecting high 
quality waters, if citizens have a viable procedural mechanism and if sufficient criteria are 
delineated to guide agency responses and allow meaningful judicial review.361  These criteria 
would elaborate on the meaning of “exceptional ecological significance,” perhaps using factors 
similar to those by which the 2012 Forest Service planning regulations measure ecosystem 
integrity.362  
  
In addition, states should be required to take concrete steps (including reducing aggregate 
discharges) to restore the quality of Tier 3 and other high quality waters covered by the anti-
degradation policy that have already been degraded.  EPA would be obliged to determine during 
each triennial review of state water quality standards whether states have complied with this 
responsibility.  EPA’s failure to require restoration when the policy demands it would then be 
judicially reviewable.363  The imposition of a restoration mandate would be consistent with the 
CWA’s overarching goal of “restor[ing]” as well as maintaining the integrity of the waters of the 
United States.364 
  
Second, EPA should promulgate a regulatory definition of “degradation.”  Formalizing 
EPA’s informal guidance directing the regions to consider “assimilative capacity” would be a 
step in the right direction.  However, this step would not go far enough because it may result in 
new or increased discharges on large lakes and rivers whose assimilative capacity appears to be 
great but may not in fact be as great as presumed, or whose aquatic environment may not 
respond in a predictable fashion to pollutants.  In addition, a mandate to consider assimilative 
capacity in isolation may still allow multiple discharges over time to severely affect the integrity 
of a water body without undergoing a single, comprehensive anti-degradation review.365  
Looking to the NWRSIA and the Organic Act for guideposts, the new definition should include 
substantive criteria and thresholds or triggers to guide the permitting process to better meet the 
goals of the anti-degradation policy and the CWA as a whole and to enable meaningful citizen 
involvement and judicial review.  As suggested above, drawing on the analogy to the Park 
Service experience, “degradation” could be defined as impairment of water quality that either 
results in loss or threatened loss of an existing or potentially viable use – l especially fishing, 
swimming, and higher uses – or adversely affects the ecological resilience of the water body, 
                                                 
360 63 Fed. Reg. at 36,786. 
361 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
362 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text; 77 Fed. Reg. 21264 (Apr. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. 
§ 219.8(a)(1)) (listing as factors relevant to the protection of ecosystem integrity (i) interdependence of terrestrial 
and aquatic ecosystems, (ii) an area’s contributions to ecological conditions within the broader landscape influenced 
by the area, (iii) conditions in the broader landscape that may influence the sustainability of resources and 
ecosystems within the affected area. (iv) system drivers such as dominant ecological processes, disturbance regimes, 
and stressors, such as natural succession, wildland fire, invasive species, and climate change; (v) the ability of 
terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems to adapt to change, and (vi) opportunities for landscape scale restoration). 
363 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706(1) (2006) (authorizing review of final agency action and of an agency’s failure to act to 
fulfill discrete statutory or regulatory mandates).  
364 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
365 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text.  
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such that its capacity to continue to provide important ecosystem services is reduced.366  In 
addition, based on the NWRSIA example, the issuance of permits involving discharges of 
specified pollutants (or amounts of pollutants) could be declared incompatible (or presumptively 
incompatible) with maintenance of the high quality waters protected by the anti-degradation 
policy.367 
 Third, states should be required to extend their anti-degradation programs to nonpoint 
source runoff.  One of the biggest holes in the anti-degradation policy is the failure to regulate 
nonpoint sources that degrade water quality.  States have the discretion to extend their anti-
degradation requirements to nonpoint sources, but it appears that states cannot be forced to do 
so.368  Even when state anti-degradation requirements nominally apply to nonpoint sources, those 
requirements sometimes effectively have no substantive content.369  As noted above, a few courts 
have upheld the EPA’s approval of a state’s water quality standards that exempted nonpoint 
source discharges from anti-degradation requirements.370  However, EPA once took the position 
that “[n]onpoint source activities are not exempt from the provisions of the anti-degradation 
policy.”371  A persuasive argument can be made that EPA should reinvigorate this position, and 
indeed that it has an affirmative duty to ensure that state programs for nonpoint source 
pollution—including anti-degradation programs—do not defeat the CWA’s objectives.  Some 
judicial interpretation of the CWA supports state efforts to control nonpoint source pollution 
through anti-degradation requirements.  The water quality standard-setting process applies to 
waters polluted by both point source and nonpoint source pollution.372  Further, EPA regulations 
already require the states to “achieve[] . . . cost-effective and reasonable best management 
practices for nonpoint source control.”373   
 Fourth, to address EPA’s failure to provide consistent follow through on requiring states 
to properly implement the anti-degradation policy, mandatory state planning and assessment 
responsibilities could be added.  For example, states might be required to consider as part of the 
triennial water quality standard revision process whether the designation of additional Tier 1, 2, 
or 3 waters is appropriate and document the results of that assessment.  In addition, the states 
should be required to explain any refusal to designate ONRWs in response to the petition process 
                                                 
366 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. See also U.S. Dep’t of Interior Federal Water Pollution Control 
Guidelines, supra note  , at 5, 7 (“[i]n no case will standards providing for less than existing water quality be 
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of a higher quality or of a quality suitable  for present and potential uses”) (emphasis added).  
367 See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. 
368 Modesitt, supra note ___, at 193-94 (assessing application of state anti-degradation programs to nonpoint source 
pollution).   
369 See, e.g., Newton County Wildlife Ass’n v. Rogers, 141 F.3d 803, 810 (8th Cir. 1998) (concluding that “the 
Arkansas statewide policy for nonpoint sources is so broadly stated that the Forest Service was not arbitrary or 
capricious in concluding this policy added nothing to its compliance obligations under federal environmental laws”). 
370 See supra notes __ - __ and accompanying text. 
371 Qs & As, supra note __, at 6 (emphasis added).  See Water Quality Standards Handbook, supra note  , § 4.8. 
372 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2006) (drawing no distinction between pollution from point sources and nonpoint 
sources); Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[N]owhere does Congress 
evidence an intent to preclude the enforcement of water quality standards that have not been translated into effluent 
discharge limitations.”). 
373 40 C.F.R. § 131.12(a)(2). See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 326-27 (2006) (“best 
practices regulation is currently the only form of federal regulation of runoff or ‘nonpoint source’ pollution”). 
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described above.  EPA would have to consider the state’s explanation in deciding whether to 
approve or disapprove state water quality standards as consistent with CWA requirements.374  
EPA determinations would then be judicially reviewable.  The CWA already requires states to 
engage in a continuing planning process that includes “adequate implementation . . . for revised 
or new water quality standards,” which of course include the anti-degradation policy.375  State 
planning responsibilities are far less rigorous under the CWA than they are under the CAA, and 
efforts by EPA during the Clinton Administration to mandate planning obligations to achieve 
water quality standards similar to state implementation plan duties under the CAA ran into 
insurmountable political opposition.376  Enhancement of selected aspects of state water quality 
standard implementation, such as those relating to compliance with the anti-degradation policy, 
is worth another look. 
 
These four reforms would promote the primary goals of the anti-degradation policy, 
especially providing a margin of safety, protecting high-value natural resources, preventing the 
development of pollution havens, and balancing environmental goals and economic growth 
opportunities.  These reforms would also do much to move the nation’s water bodies beyond the 
“least common denominator” of fishable/swimmable waters and toward the CWA’s overarching 
goal of maintaining as well as restoring the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of aquatic 
environments.  
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